CITATION: Baines v Smith & Anor [2000] NSWSC 25 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law FILE NUMBER(S): SC 12738/99 HEARING DATE(S): 2 February 2000 JUDGMENT DATE: 8 February 2000 PARTIES :
Russell George Baines
(Plaintiff)Gail Joy Smithson
Janet Smithson
(First Defendant)
(Second Defendant)JUDGMENT OF: Master Harrison
COUNSEL : Mr Goodridge
Mr W Robinson
(Plaintiff)
(Defendants)SOLICITORS: Firths
Abbout Tout
The Compensation Laywers
Sydney
(Plaintiff)
Sydney
(Defendants)CATCHWORDS: Appeal decision of costs assessor LEGISLATION CITED: Legal Profession Act CASES CITED: Gundry v Sainsbury (1910) 1 KB 645 DECISION: See para 9
5
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONMASTER HARRISON
TUESDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 2000
12738/99 - RUSSEL GEORGE BAINES vJUDGMENT (Appeal decision of costs assessor)
GAIL JOY SMITHSON & ANOR
1 MASTER: By summons filed 9 November 1999 the plaintiff seeks to appeal the decision of Robert James Charles Benjamin, costs assessor, dated 12 October 1999 in Supreme Court proceedings No 91654/99 pursuant to s 208L of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (the Act) and that the costs assessor redetermine the matter on a party/party basis.2 The bill of costs is for legal work done in relation to an appeal to the court of appeal where the defendants were appellants. The plaintiff was order to pay the defendants’ costs of the appeal on a party/party basis.
3 Section 208L of the Legal Profession Act provides:
"Appeal against decision of costs assessor as to matter of law
(1) A party to an application who is dissatisfied with a decision of a costs assessor as to a matter of law arising in the proceedings to determine the application may, in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court, appeal to the Court against the decision.
(2) After deciding the question the subject of the appeal, the Supreme Court may, unless it affirms the costs assessor's decision:
(3) On a re-determination of an application, fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received at the original proceedings, may be given."
(a) make such determination in relation to the application as, in its opinion, should have been made by the costs assessor, or
(b) remit its decision on the question to the costs assessor and order the costs assessor to re-determine the application.
4 The amount claimed in the bill of costs submitted to the costs assessor was $23,811.25. It is common ground that the account submitted by the defendants’ solicitor to the defendants was for the same amount, namely $23,811.25. A notice of objection put in issue items totalling approximately $8,000. The costs assessor reduced the bill of costs by deducting $600 claimed for counsels’ fees. Thus he allowed the full amount of professional costs claimed by the defendants’ solicitor.
5 On 12 October 1999, the costs assessor gave reasons for his decision. Relevantly he stated:6 When the costs assessor was asked for clarification of his reasons, he advised:
“I accept that costs on a Party/Party basis must be on a indemnity basis. I am satisfied that the costs claimed by the Costs Applicant are on an indemnity basis.
I am obliged to consider whether the work undertaken was reasonable and if reasonable whether the charges are fair and reasonable.
This is not a taxation of costs it is an assessment of costs. I have carefully considered the items in the costs and disbursements and the whole of the costs and disbursements. I have carefully considered all of the submissions by the Cost Respondent. I am satisfied that the amount of costs claimed by the Cost Applicant are fair and reasonable.”
7 In 1910 the then Master of the Rolls, Sir H H Cozen-Hardy asked the rhetorical question - “What are party and party costs?”. He then supplied the answer in these terms in Gundry v Sainsbury (1910) 1 KB 645 at 649:
“When I talk about costs on an indemnity basis I mean the party/party costs are by way of indemnity to the successful party. I did not mean nor did I asses the costs on an indemnity basis as may be provided by Court Orders pursuant to Section 208F(3).”
“They are not a complete indemnity but they are only given in the character of an indemnity. I cannot do better than read the opinion expressed by Bramwell, B. In Harold v Smith:
‘Costs as between party and party are given by the law as an indemnity to the person entitled to them; they are not imposed as a punishment on the party who pays them, nor given as a bonus to the party who receives them. Therefore if the extent of the damnification can be found out, the extent to which costs ought to be allowed is also ascertained.’”
8 The costs assessor’s statement that costs on a party/party basis must be on an indemnity basis has not been expressed as precisely as it could have been. However, in the next paragraph of his reasons the costs stated that he was obliged to consider whether the work undertaken was reasonable and if reasonable whether the charges were fair and reasonable. After carefully considering the bill and submissions he was satisfied that the amount claimed was fair and reasonable. The costs assessor later clarified that what he meant was that party/party costs are by way of indemnity to a successful party. This statement is correct. In any event the hourly rates charged by the solicitors involved in the litigation are modest. It is my view that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the costs assessor erred in law. The decision of the costs assessor is affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. The summons is dismissed. Costs should follow the event.
9 The orders I make are:
(1) The decision of the costs assessor dated 12 October 1999 is affirmed.(2) The appeal is dismissed.
(3) The summons is dismissed.
(4) The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs as agreed or assessed.**********
- AGLC
- Baines v Smith [2000] NSWSC 25
- Case
- [2000] NSWSC 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the costs assessed by the primary judge were reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Smith argued that the costs were excessive and not proportionate to the nature and complexity of the case. Baines, on the other hand, contended that the costs were reasonable and necessary, given the complexity of the case and the work required to achieve the outcome. The court had to determine whether the costs were fair and reasonable, taking into account the nature and complexity of the case, the skill and experience of the lawyers involved, and the overall conduct of the proceedings.
The court found that the primary judge had properly exercised their discretion in assessing the costs. The court noted that the case involved complex issues, particularly in relation to quantum, and required significant work by both parties' legal teams. The court held that the costs were reasonable and necessary in the circumstances and that the primary judge had not erred in their assessment. The court also found that the overall conduct of the proceedings was appropriate and did not warrant an adjustment to the costs awarded. The appeal was dismissed, and the costs assessed by the primary judge were upheld.
No further orders were made by the court in relation to the appeal. The decision confirmed the importance of the primary judge's discretion in assessing costs and highlighted the need for parties to be aware of the potential for costs to be awarded against them in litigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.