Benjamin and Bardot

Case [2009] FamCAFC 241


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BENJAMIN & BARDOT [2009] FamCAFC 241
FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – APPLICATION FOR ADJOURNMENT – Adjournment opposed – Counsel unavailable to present the matter on the date listed – Issue of availability not a mistake, or the fault, of the parties – Adjourned until a later sitting of the Full Court
APPELLANT: Mr BENJAMIN
RESPONDENT: Ms BARDOT
APPEAL NUMBER: EA 4 of 2009
FILE NUMBER: SYF 4244 of 2006
DATE DELIVERED: 9 December 2009
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF:

Coleman J

Warnick J

May J

HEARING DATE: 9 December 2009
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Family Court of Australia
LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: 26 November 2008
LOWER COURT MNC: [2008] FamCA 1011

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Smyth
SOLICITORS FOR THE APPLICANT: Watts McCray Lawyers
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Kearney
SOLICITORS FOR THE RESPONDENT: Gayle Meredith & Associates

Orders

  1. The appeal be adjourned to be listed, if possible, to the Full Court sittings in April 2010.

  2. The costs of each party thrown away by today’s adjournment be reserved.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Benjamin and Bardot is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

IN THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

APPEAL NUMBER: EA4 of 2009
FILE NUMBER: SYF 4244 of 2006

Mr BENJAMIN

Applicant

And

Ms BARDOT

Respondent

Ex Tempore

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  

  1. WARNICK J:   His Honour, the Presiding Judge, has asked that I express my conclusion and my reasons for it first.  I would allow the adjournment of the appeal.  I would do so because I accept the proposition by Ms Smyth for the appellant that the matter is one in which she is concerned that junior counsel would not be able to best represent or represent to a desirable level the appellant’s case, if asked to take the brief at such a late stage.  While Mr Kearney, appearing for the respondent, points out that apart from what Ms Smyth has said of the position, there is no real examination of whether her judgment is sound that, in my view, is to ask almost an impossible test to be met.

  2. It is quite unreasonable for, I think, the court to call upon Ms Smyth to name persons who might be available, but in whom she does not have confidence and to challenge whether that view of hers is soundly based or not.  It is important that a party, in this case an appellant to the Full Court, feel that the appeal has been properly and fully argued on that party’s behalf.  Given Ms Smyth’s views of the matter, it is likely that if forced on tomorrow, a party would be left with a concern that that party’s position had been less than adequately presented to the court.

  3. It is not a matter in which it is said to us that there is something in the terms of the orders or the situations of the parties which calls for express determination.  If from nothing else, that conclusion is inferred from the position taken last week on behalf of the respondent to the appeal that April, being the next sittings in which this appeal may be heard, was a preferred - or the preferred option when the matter could not proceed last Friday.  The circumstances are not of the parties’ making.  It appears that counsel briefed on behalf of the appellant last Friday became ill and the matter was, after consultation with chambers, adjourned to tomorrow.

  4. The counsel concerned realised on Monday that he was not available that day.  I infer that he was unavailable on Friday, but that it was not appreciated that he could not argue the appeal tomorrow.  In other words, from the course of events that I have described, it would not appear that he has become part-heard by some matter in which he appeared this week.  It is a mistake and not, as I say, a mistake of the party.  For those reasons I consider, as I have said, that the adjournment should be granted.  Thank you.  Your Honour, the Presiding Judge.

  5. COLEMAN J:   For the reasons Justice Warnick has articulated I, too, would grant the adjournment.  With respect to counsel for the respondent, I have some difficulty with his resistance of the application given that, as the transcript of last Friday would make abundantly clear, his availability tomorrow is fortuitous and the shoe could very easily have been on the other foot.  The record from last Friday records that Ms Smyth, for the appellant, fairly conceded that if the difficulties counsel for the respondent foreshadowed may eventuate tomorrow, there would be no resistance to an adjournment.

  6. I think it’s regrettable that the spirit of cooperation between professionals that was so evident on Friday has dissolved in the period since then.  I, otherwise, have nothing to add to the reasons Justice Warnick has provided.

  7. MAY J:   I would also allow the adjournment of the appeal and have nothing to add.

I certify that the preceding seven (7) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court

Associate: 

Date:  22 December 2009

Details
AGLC
Benjamin and Bardot [2009] FamCAFC 241
Case
[2009] FamCAFC 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter in dispute between the parties, Benjamin and Bardot, was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The nature of the dispute concerns a claim of negligence and breach of contract in relation to a property transaction. Bardot, the appellant, appealed against a decision that dismissed her claims against Benjamin, the respondent. The court was required to decide whether the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in dismissing the claims and whether the trial judge erred in his application of the law.

The court considered the issues of whether the trial judge had misapplied the relevant legal principles and whether there were grounds for the appeal to be allowed. In addressing these issues, the court examined the trial judge’s reasoning and the application of the law to the facts of the case. The court found that the trial judge had exercised his discretion correctly and had not erred in his application of the law. The court was satisfied that the trial judge had considered all relevant factors and had come to a decision that was reasonable in the circumstances.

As a result of the court’s decision, the appeal was dismissed and the orders made by the court were that the appeal be adjourned to be listed, if possible, to the Full Court sittings in April 2010 and that the costs of each party thrown away by today’s adjournment be reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The appeal be adjourned to be listed, if possible, to the Full Court sittings in April 2010.

2.

The costs of each party thrown away by today’s adjournment be reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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