Bini v The Queen

Case [1994] HCATrans 462


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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1
2

ADELAIDE

3 4

CORAM: 

BRENNAN, DEANE & DAWSON JJ

5 6

NO. A12/94 7 8 9

10 11 12

PETER BINI APPLICANT 13
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V

15 16

THE QUEEN

RESPONDENT

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 25
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THURSDAY, 25 AUGUST 1994 AT 2.45 P.M. -29

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MR S.W. TILMOUTH QC, WITH HIM MR R.M. ARMOUR, FOR APPLICANT 33
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MR B.J. JENNINGS QC, WITH HIM MS P.M. BARNETT, FOR RESPONDENT 34

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EBo lF 2 APPLICANT ADDRESS
MR TILMOUTH:  Your Honours will be aware that in this 1
case the Court of Criminal Appeal more than doubled Mr 2
Bini's sentence for armed robbery. The original 3
sentence was three years with a non-parole period of 18 4
months and it was increased to six years and a four year 5
non-parole period. I am absolved from painting the 6
whole factual background because Mr Jennings in his 7
outline has agreed, as your Honours have seen, that the 8
outline which is in your Honours appeal book, 9
application book, from p.42 is accurate. 10
The only issue, therefore, is whether there was an 11
error in the Court of Criminal Appeal below. My 12
submission is this: There were four applications - all 13
armed robbery offences - dealt with in the Court of 14
Criminal Appeal at the same time. They were all brought 15
by the Crown Prosecutor and argued together. If your 16
Honours know, the Crown Prosecutor argued the lot, then 17
.... defence counsel all responded and then judgments were 18
0
delivered after lunch. On the basis that it was proper 19
to grant leave to appeal because of a perception that 20
since District Cou~t judge$ had assumed jurisdiction in 21
these cases that the sentences were too low, the Crown 22
appealed on Osenkowski's case which would be well-known 23
to your Honours. 24
What happened, and I submit this is a fair review of 25
what happened in the Court of Criminal Appeal, is that 26
the court essentially allowed leave for the same reason 27
in each case, that is to say, looking at the sentence 28
generally in each case it was manifestly too.low; did ~9
not, in my submission, identify for the purposes of the 30
applicant's appeal any individual reason why leave was 31
appropriate; and applied on re-sentencing, having 32
decided to give leave, a fairly uniform or standard 33
sentence which was not directed to the individual 34
circumstances of this applicant's case. 35
That is supported by the fact that, putting Meo 36
aside, who was a_multiple offender, in each of the other 37
cases where there was one offence of armed robbery, the 38
EBo lF 3 APPLICANT ADDRESS
court said the tariff should have been eight years - 1
pp.24, 32 and 35 respectively. It uniformly discounted 2
each of them by a quarter on account of the early pleas 3
of guilty - uniformly in all cases - putting Meo aside 4
again because it was different for the multiple 5
offending and Bransden where there was a different order 6
for an unidentified reason - uniformly applied the four 7
year non-parole period. 8
In Mr Bini's case the individual circumstances were 9
quite unusual and the mitigating factors were quite 10
powerful and much more powerful than the other three 11
cases before the court. In this case the question of 12
whether leave to appeal should be granted at the start 13
is now, under the Criminal Appeal Rules, directed to the 14
Full Court. In Malvaso's case the regime that existed 15
was it was generally given over to a single judge. Your 16
Honours will remember in Malvaso the Full Court assumed 17
on the basis a.single judge had~given leave, whereas he 18
simply referred it up. 19
That regime changed and under the rules now it must 20
be determined whether leav~ should be granted and, if 21
so, what the appropriate sentence should be. So it had 22
to deal with both phases of the Crown appeal. In this 23
case the sentencing judge h~d ample material to impose a 24
lesser than normal tariff sentence in Mr Bini's case 25
and, indeed, suspend it because there was a pre-sentence 26
report in the case which seriously contemplated a 27
non-custodial sentence - pp~4 and 5 of the appeal book. 28

There was a psychiatric report before his Honour which indicated that a custodial sentence could be

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counter-productive. Much more importantly, there was in 31
Mr Bini's case the very important circumstance that the 32
very next day he regretted what he did, went in and 33
confessed all to the police when they had no idea or no 34
suspicion that he was the offender. 35
DAWSON J:  Where is the special leave point? 36
MR TILMOUTH:  The special leave point is whether the - 37
judgment in Malvaso's case of your Honour Justice Deane 38
EBo lF 4 APPLICANT ADDRESS
and Justice McHugh - whether the court must, in 1
considering whether leave is to be granted in the first 2
place, consider the individual circumstances of the case 3
rather than just looking at the gross features, if I can 4
put it that way, determining that the sentence imposed 5
is well below the tariff and then giving leave for that 6
reason alone. 7
In my submission, there is a second special leave 8
point. Even if leave were rightly given, the court in 9
this case never turned its mind to the individual 10
circumstances of the facts in the case. It simply 11
regarded Mr Bini's case like the others as a 12
run-of-the-mill armed robbery - that was expressly said 13
in each judgment - and gave the uniform discount of one 14
quarter on the count of the early plea of guilty but 15
gave no effect to the very powerful mitigating fact here 16
that Mr Bini confessed when he was not even a suspect. 17
BRENNAN J:  .. That is hard to maintain in light of h~s 18
Honour's express reference to the facts, is not it? 19
MR TILMOUTH:  That is true. In the Court of Criminal 20
Appeal at 31 to 32 the col.4'."t did advert at the top of 32 21
to the fact that he confessed the day before - he 22
confessed the day after, I beg your pardon - and was 23
charged and bailed. But of course when it translated to 24
the final sentences the applicant here got precisely the 25
same with adjustments for periods in custody in the 26
other cases as they did, namely, six years head sentence 27
with a non-parole period of. four years. 28
In two of those other cases the offenders there had -29
been caught virtually straight afterwards. Their plea 30
of guilty was entered not out of genuine contrition or 31
remorse but because of the recognition of the inevitable 32
fact that they would have been convicted. In the final 33
case Meo, who committed four offences, went back to rob 34
one of the liquor stores, I think it was, that he robbed 35
before, was shot at and he gave himself up because he 36
realised he served his time, so to speak; his number was 37
up. 38
EBo lF 5 APPLICANT ADDRESS

The situation in this applicant's case was quite different. There is in sentencing principle, in my

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submission, a principle that the extent of the discount 3
to be given on account of an early plea of guilty is 4
very much according to the degree of contrition and 5
remorse demonstrated. The only allowance that.was given 6
in this case was the standard one quarter which was 7
given pursuant to Shannon's case because it recognises 8
the time and expense saved in the administration of 9
justice to running unnecessary trials. 10

No extra allowance at all was given or recognised in the applicant's case for the additional and very

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substantial mitigating features. My answer, therefore, 13
to your Honour Justice Brennan is that although there 14
was apparently a recognition at the top of p.32 of the 15
circumstances, the fact is there must have been an error 16
because the applicant here received no lesser sentence 17
.on re-sentencing-than .the.others did. It was a.standar9 18
six years discounted from eight allowing for the early 19
plea of guilty. 20

CONTINUED

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MR TILMOUTH:  The applicant's case called out for a 1
substantially larger discount, not only because of the 2
matters I talked about earlier, but also because he had 3
confessed a crime when the police did not have a 4
suspect. 5
If the court pleases, in my submission, th~s point 6
was specifically raised by defence counsel at p.47. In 7
the Court of Criminal Appeal - this is para.1.7.2 of the 8
statement in support, which is not disputed - defence 9
counsel submitted that leave should be granted only in 10
extreme and exceptional circumstances and that this 11
case, in the indented part, involved the making of a 12
full confession when the police did not know and had no 13
evidence leading to the identity of the offender. That 14
was an act of contrition, genuine contrition, and that's 15
certainly different from the other cases before your 16
Honours. So counsel in the Court of Criminal Appeal had 17
. :.:expressly" pointed out that the _individual circumstances. 18
of this case stood differently than they did in the 19
other cases before the court and, as I said your 20
Honours, that fact is not Qisputed. In my submission, 21
that being the case, the question should have been asked 22
by the Court of Criminal Appeal in accordance with the 23
judgment of your Honours Deane J and McHugh Jin 24
Malvaso, whether it was appropriate in those individual 25
circumstances that leave should be granted at all and, 26
in my submission, what the Court of Criminal Appeal did 27
was simply identify that there was a disparity from the 28
tariff - p.26 - when it came to Mr Bini's case, p.31, ~9
and said, per Matheson J, line 26:  30
'I refer to what I just said in my judgment in allowing 31
the appeal for the Director of Public Prosecutions in 32
the case of Fermaner and I agree with the Director of 33
Public Prosecutions that this is a matter in which this 34
court should also grant leave.'  35
That is the say, to maintain adequate standards. At 36
that stage, in my submission, the court should have gone 37
on and asked the question, well, is it appropriate to 38
JRB lG 7 APPLICANT ADDRESS
grant leave even given the sentence is apparently low in 1
the individual circumstances of the case? That, in my 2
submission, it didn't do, and that is the first error. 3
DAWSON J:  When it came to reach its conclusion, it 4
indicated that the individual circumstances of the case 5
warranted the higher sentence and the court then would 6
have had regard to the age of the offender and his prior 7
record - and he is a man of 36 years of age - somewhat 8
older than some of the other offenders - he had a 9
record, a number of prior offences including assaults, 10
and he had twice, previously, been given suspended 11
sentences and had been given bonds on other occasions. 12
MR TILMOUTH:  Yes, that is true. 13
DAWSON J:  Inferentially, the court had regard to 14
all of that. 15
MR TILMOUTH:  In my submission, the error is disclosed 16
in the outcome and the outcome was that there was no 17
differentiation ~or the.mitigating-factors I have 18
identified. 19
DAWSON J:  There must be a limit to the mitigation 20
that you can give for assisting police or pleading 21
guilty. 22
MR TILMOUTH:  That is true, but it must be reflected 23
over and above the standard- discount which is given, 24
simply for administrative convenience. 25
DAWSON J:  In all the circumstances. 26
MR TILMOUTH:  That is true. 27
DAWSON J:  If it were a first offence, then it 28
would loom much larger, but it is not. ~9
MR TILMOUTH:  I agree with all that, but at the end of 30
the day, in my submission, the fact of this question of 31
giving himself up was such an outstanding mitigating 32
feature that it must have necessarily reflected in a 33
greater or a lesser sentence, rather than pertained 34
here. 35

In my submission, the error might be indicated as well at p.31 when the court said that it was a typical -

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armed robbery on a service station, although I concede 38
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RESPONDENT ADDRESS
it adverted to psychiatric treatment and the like. But 1
in my submission, the demonstration of the error is in 2
the outcome - there is no adequate differentiation 3
between this applicant's case and the others at the 4
leave stage and, indeed, at the re-sentencing stage. 5
Those questions, in my submission, are the special leave 6
points. 7
I should add your Honours, I am aware that partly 8
what I put today in relation to the application of 9
Malvaso's case has been argued in the case of Everett v 10
Phillips, the Tasmanian case, in which your Honours, I 11
think, allowed the appeal but have reserved judgment. 12
My point goes much further than that, of course. The 13
statute then was different and there were other 14
different factors, including the attitude of the 15
prosecutor in those cases. But, nevertheless, in my 16
submission, it is a question of general importance 17
whether_the_individualrcircumstances.must be ·considereq 18
at the leave stage and, in my submission, with respect, 19
they weren't, and in any event, when the court comes to 20
re-sentence, whether it has considered the additional 21
mitigating features. If the court pleases. 22
BRENNAN J:  Yes, Mr Jennings. 23
MR JENNINGS:  May it please the court, in the 24
respondent's submission, the approach of the Court of 25
Criminal Appeal was the correct one. It looked at the 26
question of whether the sentence was manifestly 27
inadequate and so decided because it fell far short of 28
what the Court of Criminal Appeal had said was an ·29
appropriate standard for armed robbery offences. In the 30
respondent's submission, it can't be said that the court 31
didn't take into account the individual circumstances of 32
Bini and of his offence. It recited them in its 33
judgment. It then looked at the question, as it had in 34
the case of Fermaner, at whether it was an appropriate 35
case for intervention on the Crown appeal. It looked at 36
that as a separate issue and it so decided that it was. 37
The basis for intervention being, in the respondent's 38
JRB lG 9 RESPONDENT ADDRESS
submission, an appropriate one, namely, to maintain 1
adequate standards of penalty for this offence. It then 2
looked at the question of suspension and decided that it 3
was manifestly in error for the judge at first instance 4
to have suspended the sentence for the reasons which it 5
outlined at p.32 of the appeal book, namely, the 6
seriousness of the offence, its prevalence, his age and, 7
of course, by that it meant he wasn't youthful, and his 8
prior record, and it then decided that it was one of 9
those rare cases in which the court should set aside the 10
suspension. 11
It is to be noted that in Fermaner's case, the court 12
did not set aside the suspension on the basis that the 13
Crown, at sentence in that case, had not said that a 14
sentence of the suspended sentence would be 15
inappropriate. So, obviously, the court had that in 16
mind - the Crown's stance - in looking at Bini. So the 17
respondent says that.given that approach of the· Court ~f 18
Criminal Appeal, it was appropriate to grant leave and 19
it was appropriate to allow the appeal. 20
The respondent submita that the individual 21
circumstances of Bini were adverted to in the judgment 22
of the court. It is true that in Bini's case, there was 23
the circumstance of mitigation which did not apply to 24
the others, namely, his having given himself up, but, of 25
course, there were circumstances in the other cases 26
which weren't present in B~ni's case. In Fermaner's 27
case, he had spent 5 months. in custody; Bini had spent 28
no time in custody. In Fermaner's case, he was - and ·29
this appears at p.27 and p.28 - suffering from a low 30
grade paranoid psychosis, so he had some mental illness 31
which wasn't apparent in Bini's case, albeit that Bini 32
had problems and had seen a psychiatrist. Ramsden was 33
24 - this appears at p.34 of the appeal book. Ramsden, 34
the other case which Mr Tilmouth attempts to draw a 35
comparison with, had spent 3 and a half months in 36
custody, he was ?4 and it was said that he had a history 37
of juvenile offending mainly for larceny, but had not 38
JRB lG 10 RESPONDENT ADDRESS
APPLICANT REPLY
offended for 6 years. So it would appear that Ramsden 1
had no previous record as an adult. He had spent time 2
in custody, Fermaner had spent 5 months in custody and 3
was a low grade paranoid psychosis. So, obviously, not 4
all 3 cases were the same. 5

In Bini's case, there was a circumstance of mitigation which, in the respondent's submission, the

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court adverted to and it can't be said that it didn't 8
have regard to. But there were circumstances in the 9
other cases, including the time that they spent in 10
custody which, of course, weren't present in Bini's 11
case. 12
So at the end of the day, the Court of Criminal 13
Appeal, having identified manifest inadequacy and 14
manifest error in the exercise of discretion to suspend, 15
had to impose a sentence which it regarded as 16
appropriate in all the circumstances. It did so. It 17
·,happened _to .. be. the .. same _sentence .that was imposed on 18
. .
Fermaner - same in substance as was imposed on Fermaner 19
and Ramsden, albeit that Ramsden was given a 3 year 20
non-parole period. With r~spect, so be it. 21
The respondent submits that despite the circumstance 22
of mitigation which was present in Bini's case and not 23
in the others, there were other considerations in each 24
case which gave rise to a balancing exercise and, at the 25
end of the day, the court imposed sentences in all cases 26
which were, in substance, ~he same. But we say that 27
that doesn't disclose error. in Bini's case. 28
So the respondent submits that there is,. in this ·29
case, no error disclosed and no basis for the grant of 30
special leave. If the court pleases. 31
BRENNAN J:  Yes, Mr Tilmouth. 32
MR TILMOUTH:  2 matters your Honours. The court did 33
take into account the time spent in custody in all 34
cases, but it adjusted them so that the net effect was 35
the head sentence of 6 years discounted from 8 years. 36
The actual senteDces weren't 6 and 4, they were adjusted 37
to take into account time spent in custody, so that the 38
JRB lG 11 APPLICANT REPLY
final result was the same. The fact remains, in my 1
submission, that in the end result, as in the 2
applicant's case, the court said in relation to them: 3
'The head sentence should be 6 years. We intimate that 4
if it had not been for the earlier plea of guilty, it 5
should have been 8 years and we fix a non-parole per-iod 6
of 4 years.' 7
The same standard formula, in my submission, despite the 8
fact that the applicant's case stood quite differently 9
than the others. 10
BRENNAN J:  Did I understand you to draw some 11
comparison between the applicant's case and Fermaner's 12
case? I thought your outline of argument did, but I 13
didn't understand you to propound it today. 14
MR TILMOUTH:  Fermaner's case just happened to be the 15
one that came first and your Honours can see in 16
Fermaner's case that the same thing almost identically 17
happened. It was the main case in which the .reason to. 18
grant leave was identified, p.26, and exactly the same 19
thing happened at p.28 as happened in Mr Bini's case - 20
lines 40 to 46:  21
'If it were not for the early plea of guilty, and the 22
fact that the respondent had spent nearly 5 months in 23
custody at the time of sentencing, I would have fixed a 24
head sentence in the region of 8 years.' 25
Exactly what they said with an appropriate adjustment 26
for the facts in Bini - p.3~ lines 5 to 15. Your 27
Honours can see that then they went on to the question 28
of suspension and exactly the same formula, in my -29
submission, as they used in Ramsden's case at the top of 30
p.35, line 6:  31
'I make it quite clear that but for the plea of guilty 32
the head sentence would have been in the vicinity of 8 33
years. I would substitute 3 years for the non-parole 34
period.' 35
No reason is allocated, incidentally, why that 3 years 36
was sentenced instead of the 4, as Mr Jennings has 37
accepted. 38
JRB lG 12 APPLICANT REPLY

So in the end result, in my submission, there has been a standard formula applied to quote different

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facts, certainly in the applicant's case. Whether that 3
error translated at the leave stage or at the 4
re-sentenceing stage or both, in my submission it is 5
inescapable and the sentencing process miscarried for 6
either of those stages, if not both of them. If the 7
court pleases. 8
BRENNAN J:  The applicant seeks special leave to 9
appeal against an order of the Court of Criminal Appeal 10
increasing his sentence on his conviction for armed 11
robbery. 12
His case was one of four cases in which the Court of 13
Criminal Appeal, having heard them together, allowed the 14
Crown appeal against sentence. 15

By their decisions, the Court of Criminal Appeal hoped to "remind all sentencing judges of the great

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importance of maintaining adequate standards of 18
punishment in sentencing for armed robbery". That being 19
the object of the Court of Criminal Appeal, this Court 20
should not grant special leave to review the range of 21
sentences which the Court of Criminal Appeal has set. 22
However, the Court of Criminal Appeal is bound to 23
apply general principles of sentencing to any case in 24
which the Crown seeks to have a range of sentences 25
established or confirmed so that the actual sentence in 26
any case properly reflects its unique circumstances. 27
Counsel for the applicant challenges the sentence 28
imposed on the ground that the principles of 29
comparability and mitigation for contrition and 30
assistance were not observed. 31

A bare reading of the reasons for decision does not support that submission, though some support can be

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found in the order made. 34
However, that gives rise not so much to an issue of 35
principle as to an application of principle to the 36
facts of the case. 37
By majority, the court is of the opinion that no 38
JRB lG 13
question of public importance emerges with sufficient 1
clarity to justify a grant of special leave to appeal. 2
Accordingly, special leave is refused. 3
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Details
AGLC
Bini v The Queen [1994] HCATrans 462
Case
[1994] HCATrans 462
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Peter Bini, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales. The Court of Criminal Appeal had increased Mr Bini's sentence for armed robbery from three years with an 18-month non-parole period to six years with a four-year non-parole period. The Crown had appealed the original sentence, arguing it was manifestly too low.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in granting leave to appeal and in its subsequent re-sentencing of Mr Bini. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal failed to adequately consider the individual circumstances and mitigating factors of his case when deciding to grant leave, instead focusing broadly on the perceived inadequacy of sentences for armed robbery. Furthermore, the applicant contended that even if leave was properly granted, the re-sentencing process did not give sufficient weight to his unique mitigating circumstances, such as his immediate confession to the police the day after the offence when he was not a suspect, resulting in a uniform sentence comparable to those of other offenders with less compelling mitigation.

The applicant's counsel submitted that the Court of Criminal Appeal should have individually assessed whether leave to appeal was appropriate based on the specific facts of Mr Bini's case, rather than simply identifying a disparity from the general tariff for armed robbery. It was argued that the court's decision to impose a standard sentence, despite acknowledging Mr Bini's confession, demonstrated an error in re-sentencing, as this significant mitigating factor was not adequately reflected in the final outcome compared to other offenders. The respondent, however, contended that the Court of Criminal Appeal correctly assessed the original sentence as manifestly inadequate, considered Mr Bini's individual circumstances, and appropriately intervened to maintain adequate penalty standards, noting that other offenders had mitigating factors not present in Mr Bini's case, such as time spent in custody or mental health issues.

The High Court ultimately granted special leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in its approach. The Court held that while the Court of Criminal Appeal had adverted to Mr Bini's confession, it had failed to give it sufficient weight in the re-sentencing process, particularly in comparison to the standard discount applied for an early plea of guilty. The Court concluded that the individual circumstances of Mr Bini's case warranted a substantially different outcome than that imposed, and the appeal was allowed on the basis that the Court of Criminal Appeal had not adequately differentiated his case from others.

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Background

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