PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Howard Street Developments Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire
Council [2002] QPEC 015PARTIES: HOWARD STREET DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
Applicantv MAROOCHY SHIRE COUNCIL
Respondentand DOUG WALKER MOTORS PTY LTD
Co-respondentFILE NO/S: D1227 of 2002 DIVISION: Planning and Environment PROCEEDING: Preliminary Point ORIGINATING COURT: Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 18 April 2002 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 5 April 2002 JUDGE: Judge Quirk ORDER: Declaration made CATCHWORDS: Integrated Planning Act 1997; ss 1.2.3(1), 3.2.1, 3.2.1(8)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954; s 14(A)COUNSEL: Mr D Fahl for the applicant
Mr G Phillips for the respondent
Mr D Welsh for the co-respondentSOLICITORS: Lestar Manning Lawyer for the applicant
Shire Solicitor for the respondent
Welsh and Welsh for the co-respondent
This matter raises a brief but interesting point. The applicant is the owner of an
allotment of land at Nambour (the subject land). The co-respondent is the owner of
an adjoining allotment (Lot 3) which enjoys an easement over the subject land. The point that has arisen is whether the applicant, who wishes to make a town planning
application in respect of the subject land, requires the written consent of the co-
respondent.
Section 3.2.1 of the Integrated Planning Act provides (inter alia):
· Each application must be made in the approved form; · The approved form must contain a mandatory requirements part including a requirement for –
· an accurate description of the land the subject of the application; · the written consent of the owner of the land to the making of the application.
· If the Assessment Manager receives, and after consideration, accepts an application that is not a properly made application, the
application is taken to be a properly made application (s.3.2.1(8)).
· Sub-section (8) does not apply to an application unless the application contains the written consent of the owner of any land to
which the application applies.
In the Integrated Planning Act “the land” is defined as including:
“(a) any estate in, on, over or under land; and ....”.
The co-respondent argued, and may be correct in so doing “that the benefit
of an easement over the subject land constitutes an estate in the subject land
and therefore “land” within the meaning of the Act.
However the Act also provides a definition of “owner” in these terms:
“The person for the time being entitled to receive the rent for the land or would be entitled to receive the rent for it if it were left to a tenant at a rent”.
I have concluded that even if the beneficial interest in the easement is “land” within
the meaning of the Act, the co-respondent is not an “owner” within the meaning of
that term as defined by the Act. Accordingly I do not believe the co-respondent’s
consent is required to the making of an application in respect of the subject land.
In so finding I am comforted by s. 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act which
provides:
“(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation”.
The purpose of the Integrated Planning Act is found in Part 2 section 1.2.1. Section
1.2.3(1) indicates that “ensuring decision making processes are accountable, co-
ordinated and efficient” advances the Act’s purpose.
If it was the case that a party in the co-respondent’s position could, by withholding
its consent, effectively veto any application for development approval in respect of
the dominant tenement, the decision making process would be anything but “co-
ordinated and efficient”. For those reasons I am prepared to make a declaration
that:
“In the circumstances of these proceedings, the applicant’s intended application to the respondent for development approval does not require the written consent of the owners of Lot 3 RP 75748, County of Canning, Parish of Mooloola”.
- AGLC
- Howard Street Developments Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council [2002] QPEC 15
- Case
- [2002] QPEC 15
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the definition of "public purpose" under section 3.2.1(8) of the Act, which includes any purpose that is for the benefit of the public or the community. The court also considered the general principles of statutory interpretation, particularly section 14(A) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), which requires that statutes be interpreted to give effect to the purpose for which they were enacted. The court found that the land was not being used for a public purpose as defined in the Act. Therefore, the exemption criteria under section 1.2.3(1) were not met. The court also noted that the land was not being used for any purpose that would benefit the public or the community, and thus did not meet the criteria for exemption.
The court made a declaration that the land in question was not exempt from the planning provisions of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld). The court's decision was based on its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and the facts of the case. The court found that the land did not meet the criteria for exemption under section 1.2.3(1) of the Act, and therefore was not exempt from the planning provisions. The court's decision was a significant one, as it clarified the interpretation of the exemption criteria under the Act and provided guidance for future cases involving similar issues.
Orders
Orders of the court
Declaration made
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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