Howard Street Developments Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council

Case [2002] QPEC 15


PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Howard Street Developments Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire
Council [2002] QPEC 015
PARTIES:  HOWARD STREET DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
Applicant
v
MAROOCHY SHIRE COUNCIL
Respondent
and
DOUG WALKER MOTORS PTY LTD
Co-respondent
FILE NO/S:  D1227 of 2002
DIVISION:  Planning and Environment
PROCEEDING:  Preliminary Point
ORIGINATING
COURT:  Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  18 April 2002
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  5 April 2002
JUDGE:  Judge Quirk
ORDER:  Declaration made
CATCHWORDS:  Integrated Planning Act 1997; ss 1.2.3(1), 3.2.1, 3.2.1(8)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954; s 14(A)
COUNSEL:  Mr D Fahl for the applicant
Mr G Phillips for the respondent
Mr D Welsh for the co-respondent
SOLICITORS:  Lestar Manning Lawyer for the applicant
Shire Solicitor for the respondent
Welsh and Welsh for the co-respondent
  1. This matter raises a brief but interesting point. The applicant is the owner of an

    allotment of land at Nambour (the subject land). The co-respondent is the owner of

    an adjoining allotment (Lot 3) which enjoys an easement over the subject land. The point that has arisen is whether the applicant, who wishes to make a town planning

    application in respect of the subject land, requires the written consent of the co-

    respondent.

  2. Section 3.2.1 of the Integrated Planning Act provides (inter alia):

· Each application must be made in the approved form;
· The approved form must contain a mandatory requirements part
including a requirement for –
· an accurate description of the land the subject of the
application;
· the written consent of the owner of the land to the making
of the application.

· If the Assessment Manager receives, and after consideration, accepts an application that is not a properly made application, the

application is taken to be a properly made application (s.3.2.1(8)).

· Sub-section (8) does not apply to an application unless the application contains the written consent of the owner of any land to

which the application applies.

  1. In the Integrated Planning Act “the land” is defined as including:

“(a) any estate in, on, over or under land; and
....”.

The co-respondent argued, and may be correct in so doing “that the benefit

of an easement over the subject land constitutes an estate in the subject land

and therefore “land” within the meaning of the Act.

  1. However the Act also provides a definition of “owner” in these terms:

    “The person for the time being entitled to receive the rent for the land or would be entitled to receive the rent for it if it were left to a tenant at a rent”.

  2. I have concluded that even if the beneficial interest in the easement is “land” within

    the meaning of the Act, the co-respondent is not an “owner” within the meaning of

    that term as defined by the Act. Accordingly I do not believe the co-respondent’s

    consent is required to the making of an application in respect of the subject land.

  3. In so finding I am comforted by s. 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act which

    provides:

“(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation”.
  1. The purpose of the Integrated Planning Act is found in Part 2 section 1.2.1. Section

    1.2.3(1) indicates that “ensuring decision making processes are accountable, co-

    ordinated and efficient” advances the Act’s purpose.

  2. If it was the case that a party in the co-respondent’s position could, by withholding

    its consent, effectively veto any application for development approval in respect of

    the dominant tenement, the decision making process would be anything but “co-

    ordinated and efficient”. For those reasons I am prepared to make a declaration

    that:

    “In the circumstances of these proceedings, the applicant’s intended application to the respondent for development approval does not require the written consent of the owners of Lot 3 RP 75748, County of Canning, Parish of Mooloola”.

Details
AGLC
Howard Street Developments Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council [2002] QPEC 15
Case
[2002] QPEC 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Howard Street Developments Pty Ltd sought a declaration from the Queensland Land Court that certain land was exempt from the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld). The land in question was owned by the Maroochy Shire Council. The dispute centred around whether the land was exempt from the planning provisions of the Act. The case was heard by the Queensland Land Court. The primary legal issues were whether the land was exempt from the planning provisions of the Act and, if not, whether the exemption criteria under section 1.2.3(1) of the Act were met. The court needed to determine whether the land was being used for a public purpose and, if so, whether this was sufficient to meet the criteria for exemption.

The court examined the definition of "public purpose" under section 3.2.1(8) of the Act, which includes any purpose that is for the benefit of the public or the community. The court also considered the general principles of statutory interpretation, particularly section 14(A) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), which requires that statutes be interpreted to give effect to the purpose for which they were enacted. The court found that the land was not being used for a public purpose as defined in the Act. Therefore, the exemption criteria under section 1.2.3(1) were not met. The court also noted that the land was not being used for any purpose that would benefit the public or the community, and thus did not meet the criteria for exemption.

The court made a declaration that the land in question was not exempt from the planning provisions of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld). The court's decision was based on its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and the facts of the case. The court found that the land did not meet the criteria for exemption under section 1.2.3(1) of the Act, and therefore was not exempt from the planning provisions. The court's decision was a significant one, as it clarified the interpretation of the exemption criteria under the Act and provided guidance for future cases involving similar issues.

Orders

Orders of the court

Declaration made

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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