HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON J
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY STEPHEN GROOM FOR LEAVE TO ISSUE OR FILE
[2025] HCASJ 19
Date of Judgment: 29 July 2025
A16 of 2025
ORDER
1.The application filed on 27 June 2025 for leave to issue or file the application for a constitutional or other writ dated 27 May 2025 is refused.
Representation
The applicant is unrepresented
GLEESON J. By application filed on 27 June 2025, Mr Groom seeks leave, on an ex parte basis, to issue or to file a document pursuant to r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) ("the Rules"). The document is an application for a constitutional or other writ directed to the "Chief Registrar of the High Court of Australia". Leave is necessary because of a direction made by Gordon J on 6 June 2025 pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the Rules that the Registrar of this Court is to refuse to issue or file that document without first having and obtaining the leave of a Justice of this Court.
The application complies with r 6.07.3 and is supported by two affidavits sworn by Mr Groom and filed on 27 June 2025 and 4 July 2025 respectively. I have read both affidavits.
For the following reasons, leave to file the proposed application should be refused without listing the application for an oral hearing.
The relevant principles
The discretion to refuse the leave sought is to be exercised by reference to the criteria set out in r 6.07.1, namely whether the proposed application "appears ... 'on its face' to be an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court".[1] Implicit in the requirement that a document the subject of an application under r 6.07.3 be considered "on its face" is that such an application falls to be determined on the papers,[2] that is, without an oral hearing. While there are no "closed categories" of what amounts to an abuse of process, that concept captures attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on bases that are confused or manifestly untenable.[3]
Consideration
[1]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [11]; 376 ALR 567 at 570.
[2]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [12]; 376 ALR 567 at 570.
[3]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [13]; 376 ALR 567 at 570.
The proposed application is improperly constituted, because the "Chief Registrar of the High Court of Australia" is a non-existent person, and no relief could be granted against that defendant.[4]
[4]cf High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), ss 18 and 26(1); Maritime Services Board of New South Wales v Australian Chamber of Shipping [1977] 1 NSWLR 648 at 659.
Further, the principal relief sought by the proposed application comprises a writ of mandamus directed to "the Registrar" of the High Court. That is also a non-existent person,[5] so that no relief could be granted in the terms of the principal relief sought.
[5]cf High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), ss 4 (definitions of "Deputy Registrar" and "Senior Registrar"), 18 and 26(1).
The proposed writ of mandamus seeks to have a "written request for judicial direction dated 16 May 2025" placed before a Justice of this Court. Mr Groom's affidavit filed on 4 July 2025 annexes a letter dated "16 May 2015", addressed to the Deputy Registrar, and entitled "Request for Judicial Direction — Uncertain Jurisdiction Due to Absence of Complainant and Respondent". That letter refers to an intended application "challenging the validity of a Domestic Violence Order originally issued by the Magistrates Court of South Australia". The letter states a request:
"... that this matter be placed before a Justice of the Court to determine:
·Whether I may file an application (seeking a declaration or constitutional relief) in the absence of a named respondent at this stage, or
·Whether the Court can otherwise provide direction on how I may proceed lawfully and fairly in light of this unique obstruction."
The facts that Mr Groom identifies as "this unique obstruction" are set out in the letter.
There is no arguable basis for a writ of mandamus in the terms sought, directed to any person or for any of the other ancillary relief sought. Mr Groom's request is not capable of engaging the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the proposed application is "manifestly untenable" on its face and should be refused.[6]
Disposition
[6]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [13]; 376 ALR 567 at 570.
The application dated 27 June 2025 for leave to issue or file the application for a constitutional or other writ dated 27 May 2025 is refused.
- AGLC
- In the Matter Of An Application BY Stephen Groom for Leave To Issue Or File [2025] HCASJ 19
- Case
- [2025] HCASJ 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the Court needed to decide were whether the proposed application was properly constituted and whether it fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court needed to consider whether the application was an abuse of process, frivolous, or vexatious. The Court also needed to determine whether the proposed application was properly directed to a non-existent person, and whether the proposed relief was available under the Court's jurisdiction.
The Court held that the proposed application was improperly constituted because it named non-existent persons as defendants. The Court also held that the proposed relief was not available under the Court's jurisdiction because the proposed writ of mandamus was not arguable on its face. The Court held that the proposed application was "manifestly untenable" and should be refused. The Court exercised its discretion to refuse the leave sought, in accordance with the criteria set out in r 6.07.1 of the Court's rules.
The Court refused the application filed on 27 June 2025 for leave to issue or file the proposed application for a constitutional or other writ dated 27 May 2025.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application filed on 27 June 2025 for leave to issue or file the application for a constitutional or other writ dated 27 May 2025 is refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON J
The discretion to refuse the leave sought is to be exercised by reference to the criteria set out in r 6.07.1, namely whether the proposed application "appears ... 'on its face' to be an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court".[1] Implicit in the requirement that a document the subject of an application under r 6.07.3 be considered "on its face" is that such an application falls to be determined on the papers,[2] that is, without an oral hearing. While there are no "closed categories" of what amounts to an abuse of process, that concept captures attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on bases that are confused or manifestly untenable.[3]Consideration [1]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [11]; 376 ALR 567 at 570. [2]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [12]; 376 ALR 567 at 570. [3]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [13]; 376 ALR 567 at 570. The proposed application is improperly constituted, because the "Chief Registrar of the High Court of Australia" is a non-existent person, and no relief could be granted against that defendant.[4] [4]cf High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), ss 18 and 26(1); Maritime Services Board of New South Wales v Australian Chamber of Shipping [1977] 1 NSWLR 648 at 659. Further, the principal relief sought by the proposed application comprises a writ of mandamus directed to "the Registrar" of the High Court. That is also a non-existent person,[5] so that no relief could be granted in the terms of the principal relief sought. [5]cf High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), ss 4 (definitions of "Deputy Registrar" and "Senior Registrar"), 18 and 26(1). The proposed writ of mandamus seeks to have a "written request for judicial direction dated 16 May 2025" placed before a Justice of this Court. Mr Groom's affidavit filed on 4 July 2025 annexes a letter dated "16 May 2015", addressed to the Deputy Registrar, and entitled "Request for Judicial Direction — Uncertain Jurisdiction Due to Absence of Complainant and Respondent". That letter refers to an intended application "challenging the validity of a Domestic Violence Order originally issued by the Magistrates Court of South Australia". The letter states a request:"... that this matter be placed before a Justice of the Court to determine:·Whether I may file an application (seeking a declaration or constitutional relief) in the absence of a named respondent at this stage, or·Whether the Court can otherwise provide direction on how I may proceed lawfully and fairly in light of this unique obstruction." The facts that Mr Groom identifies as "this unique obstruction" are set out in the letter. There is no arguable basis for a writ of mandamus in the terms sought, directed to any person or for any of the other ancillary relief sought. Mr Groom's request is not capable of engaging the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the proposed application is "manifestly untenable" on its face and should be refused.[6]Disposition [6]Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [13]; 376 ALR 567 at 570.