John Casley v Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Case [2014] HCASL 113


JOHN CASLEY

v

AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

[2014] HCASL 113
M123/2013

  1. On 27 March 2013, the applicant brought defamation proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, alleging that he had been defamed on one of the respondent's radio talkback segments on 2 July 2010 ("the broadcast").  Following the broadcast, the applicant had lodged a complaint with the Australian Communications and Media Authority ("ACMA").  On 6 July 2011, the applicant received ACMA's final report in relation to the applicant's complaint, which concluded that there had been no breach of the respondent's Code of Practice.  On 7 May 2012, ACMA informed the applicant that there was no right to have ACMA review its decision and no provision for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  

  2. Under s 5(1AAA) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ("the Act"), a one year limitation period applied to the commencement of defamation proceedings. The applicant sought an extension of time, pursuant to s 23B(2) of the Act, in which to commence defamation proceedings against the respondent.

  3. On 15 May 2013, the Supreme Court (Beach J) dismissed the application for an extension of time.  Beach J held that the ACMA complaint process was not an alternative to defamation litigation and that the remedies sought by the applicant always required the bringing of proceedings in court.  His Honour was not satisfied that it was not reasonable in all the circumstances for the applicant to have commenced defamation proceedings within one year of the date of the broadcast.

  4. On 15 August 2013, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Hansen JA and Robson AJA) refused the applicant leave to appeal.  The Court of Appeal held that Beach J's findings were correct and that the length of any extension was a matter of discretion. 

  5. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal to this Court on the grounds that the Court of Appeal erred in its construction and application of s 23B(2) of the Act. There is no reason to doubt the Court of Appeal's conclusions regarding the applicable statutory test and the question as to discretion does not arise. Any appeal would have insufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave. The application for special leave should be refused.

S.M. Kiefel
19 June 2014
P.A. Keane
  1. Pursuant to r 41.11.1 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application with costs.

Details
AGLC
John Casley v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2014] HCASL 113
Case
[2014] HCASL 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, John Casley, sought special leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had dismissed his appeal against the dismissal of his application for an extension of time to bring defamation proceedings against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The application was brought after Casley was allegedly defamed in a radio broadcast, and a complaint to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) concluded that there had been no breach of the ABC’s Code of Practice. Casley argued that he should have been granted an extension of time to bring defamation proceedings, as he had relied on the ACMA complaint process, which did not provide a right to review. The Supreme Court dismissed Casley’s application for an extension, and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the complaint process was not an alternative to defamation litigation and that the length of any extension was a matter of discretion.

The central issue before the court was whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its construction and application of s 23B(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic). The court had to determine if the ACMA complaint process could be considered an alternative to litigation for the purposes of extending the limitation period for bringing defamation proceedings. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Court of Appeal had correctly exercised its discretion in denying the extension of time and if the applicant's appeal had sufficient prospects of success to warrant special leave. The court concluded that there was no error in the Court of Appeal’s construction and application of the relevant statute, and that the appeal lacked the necessary prospects of success to merit special leave.

In reaching its decision, the court noted that the ACMA complaint process was not intended to replace the need for litigation in defamation cases, and therefore, it could not be considered an alternative means of pursuing a claim. The court found that the Court of Appeal had correctly exercised its discretion in denying the extension of time and upheld the Supreme Court’s decision. Consequently, the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed, and the court directed the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application with costs.

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