NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT
CITATION: Kew v Commissioner for Fair Trading & Anor [2005] NSWSC 1100
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law
FILE NUMBER(S): 14160/05
HEARING DATE{S): 26, 28 October 2005
JUDGMENT DATE: 28/10/2005
PARTIES:
Michael Owen Kew v The Commissioner for Fair Trading and Stephen Robinson
JUDGMENT OF: Michael Grove J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Not Applicable
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): Not Applicable
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Not Applicable
COUNSEL:
Dr. G. Flick SC with S. Dewberry (Plaintiff)
R. Cogswell SC with B. Baker (solicitor) (Defendants)
SOLICITORS:
Rhodens, (Dandenong, Vic) (Plaintiff)
by their City Agents: Jemmeson & Fisher
Crown Solicitor (Defendants)
CATCHWORDS:
LOCAL COURT
INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS BY COURT ATTENDANCE NOTICE
AMENDMENT SOUGHT IN LOCAL COURT SUBSEQUENT TO ISSUE OF SUPREME COURT SUMMONS
PREMATURE
SOME RELIEF GRANTED BY CONSENT
BALANCE SUMMONS STRUCK OUT
ACTS CITED:
DECISION:
BALANCE OF SUMMONS STRUCK OUT.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONMICHAEL GROVE J
Friday 28 October 2005
14160/05 MICHAEL OWEN KEW v THE COMMISSIONER FOR FAIR TRADING & ANOR
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: Having regard to the exchange with counsel, I shall only briefly refer to the reasons for the orders I am about to make.
These proceedings were before the Court two days ago and, by consent, declarations were made in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of the current summons. The question of costs was reserved.
The reason for the adjournment until today was to enable the Court to be informed as to the progress of the matter which is currently before the magistrate at the Local Court at Parramatta. It is common ground that yesterday an application was made to substitute another delegate of the Commissioner for Fair Trading as the institutor, if I can use that word, of proceedings which are reflected in the issue of Court Attendance Notices against the plaintiff before this Court. The magistrate's decision to refuse the application was handed down, I am told, shortly before 4pm yesterday afternoon.
The defendants wish to consider their position. As I indicated to counsel, however, it seems to me that whilst the balance of prayers in the summons perceptibly have a hypothetical element, it seems to me to be contrary to the interests of the Court and the parties to allow it to be further complicated.
The course which I have proposed, and that I raised with counsel is, having made the declarations in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, to strike out the balance of the summons, noting that this is done without prejudice to the plaintiff to raise those matters in any further proceedings. That is not the subject of contention on behalf of the defendants. Neither have I heard any submissions on behalf of the defendants against my disclosed provisional view, that the defendants should pay the plaintiff's costs of this summons.
Application is made on behalf of the plaintiff that those costs should be ordered on an indemnity basis and should include the costs of the proceedings before the magistrate. As I have indicated, the proceedings before the magistrate are essentially part heard and, in any event, I see no reason why I should intervene in relation to the costs relative to them. Neither do I see any reason for the imposition upon the defendants of indemnity costs, although I am of the view that they should pay the costs of the summons.
Accordingly, repeating the indication that the orders I am about to make are without prejudice to the ability of the plaintiff to raise similar matters in any further proceedings, the balance of the summons which has been adjourned is struck out. I order the defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs of the summons in this Court.
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LAST UPDATED: 17/11/2005
- AGLC
- Kew v Commissioner for Fair Trading [2005] NSWSC 1100
- Case
- [2005] NSWSC 1100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal principles surrounding the institution of proceedings and the amendment of documents in court proceedings. The court found that the application for amendment was indeed premature as the summons had already been issued in the Supreme Court. However, the court also noted that some relief could be granted by consent, as the parties had agreed on certain aspects of the proceedings. Given these circumstances, the court decided to strike out the balance of the summons, as it was no longer necessary to proceed with the entire application. This decision was made in light of the fact that the primary issue of amendment had been rendered moot by the issuance of the summons in the Supreme Court.
The court's reasoning was based on the principle that court proceedings should not be unduly prolonged and that the interests of justice should be served by resolving matters efficiently. By striking out the balance of the summons, the court ensured that the proceedings would not be further delayed and that the parties could focus on resolving the remaining issues in the Supreme Court. The court's decision to grant some relief by consent demonstrated a willingness to accommodate the parties' agreements and to avoid unnecessary litigation.
In conclusion, the court found that the plaintiff's application for amendment was premature and struck out the balance of the summons. Some relief was granted by consent, and the court's decision aimed to ensure the efficient resolution of the parties' disputes. The court's decision was based on legal principles and the interests of justice, and it allowed the proceedings to move forward in a timely and efficient manner.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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