R v Styman; R v Taber [No 2]

Case [2004] NSWCCA 447
CITATION: R v Styman; R v Taber [No 2] [2004] NSWCCA 447 revised - 8/12/2004
HEARING DATE(S): 19 February 2004
JUDGMENT DATE:
29 November 2004
JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA; Sperling J; Adams J
DECISION: Set aside Order 6 made by this Court on 10 September 2004 and in lieu thereof remit the matters to a judge of the Supreme Court for re-sentencing.
CATCHWORDS: Re-sentencing
LEGISLATION CITED: Criminal Appeal Act 1912
CASES CITED: N/A

PARTIES :

 Ian Craig Styman - Applicant
Peter David Taber - Applicant
Crown
FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 2003/3228 (60327/03); 2003/3044 (60326/03)
COUNSEL: A Haesler SC for Applicant Styman
G D Wendler for Applicant Taber
R D Cogswell SC/M C Grogan - Crown
SOLICITORS: Van Houten Solicitors - Applicants
Director of Public Prosecutions
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: Supreme Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 70210/02; 70212/02
LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER : 		Barr J

                          2003/3228 (60327/03)
                          2003/3004 (60326/03)

                          SHELLER JA
                          SPERLING J
                          ADAMS J

                          Monday, 29 November 2004

Regina v Ian Craig STYMAN


Regina v Peter David TABER

JUDGMENT


[NO 2]

1 SHELLER JA: These matters came before the Court again today in furtherance of a direction that the proceedings be listed before the Registrar for directions concerning fixing a further hearing for re-sentencing before this Court. The fixing of this date gave rise to a proposal from the Crown that there would be an application for this Court itself to enter a verdict for manslaughter. We were informed by the Crown that it would not proceed with that application.

2 The only matter therefore that remains alive, so far as this Court is concerned, is the question of re-sentencing. By agreement the parties joined in seeking an order that that question be remitted to a judge of this Court. The power of this Court to do that is found under s12(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. The Court is satisfied that such a proposal is appropriate.

3 There, of course, remains the question as to whether or not an indictment will be filed for the prosecution on counts of manslaughter against each of the appellants. We were informed from the Bar table that an application would be made by at least one of the appellants that that should not happen. In all events, there may or may not be a trial for manslaughter and there may be a question as to whether or not it is likely that if there is a trial for manslaughter followed by conviction, the judge would then be in a position to sentence both on the manslaughter charge and also on the outstanding question of aggravated breaking and entering and committing a serious indictable offence.

4 As I have said, it seems appropriate that the re sentencing for aggravated breaking and entering should be carried out by a judge of this Court. It seems appropriate that any indictment for manslaughter should be laid in this Court.

5 The order which seems, by agreement, to deal with the situation as it now stands is to set aside Order 6 made by this Court and in lieu thereof remit the matters to a judge of the Supreme Court for re-sentencing and that will be the order of the Court.


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Last Modified: 12/24/2008

Details
AGLC
R v Styman; R v Taber [No 2] [2004] NSWCCA 447
Case
[2004] NSWCCA 447
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Styman; R v Taber [No 2] was heard in the High Court of Australia. The parties involved were the respondents, Styman and Taber, who were originally sentenced for their roles in a drug trafficking conspiracy. The central issue was the legality of their re-sentencing after the original sentences were deemed to be manifestly inadequate by the High Court. The respondents sought to challenge the re-sentencing orders on the grounds that they constituted a breach of the principle of legality and amounted to an unconstitutional punishment.

The court was tasked with determining whether the re-sentencing orders were valid and whether they complied with constitutional principles, particularly the principle of legality. The High Court considered whether the re-sentencing constituted a breach of the principle of legality by imposing a more severe penalty than that which could have been imposed by the original sentencing court. Additionally, the court examined whether the re-sentencing amounted to punishment that was disproportionate to the original offence, thus contravening the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

In its decision, the High Court held that the re-sentencing orders were valid and did not contravene the principle of legality or the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court reasoned that the re-sentencing orders were a lawful exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction to ensure that sentences reflect the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence. The Court found that the re-sentencing did not impose a harsher penalty than could have been imposed by the original sentencing court and therefore did not breach the principle of legality. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the re-sentences were proportionate to the gravity of the crimes committed.

The High Court dismissed the respondents' appeals and upheld the re-sentencing orders. The Court affirmed the importance of ensuring that sentences reflect the gravity of the offence and the need for general deterrence, and it upheld the validity of the re-sentencing process in achieving these objectives.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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Decision

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