Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving & Land Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2013] NSWSC 1514 Hearing dates: 15 October 2013 Decision date: 15 October 2013 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Price J Decision: Report admitted into evidence
Catchwords: Evidence - admissibility - whether discretion to exclude should be exercised. Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 s 135 Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (plaintiff)
Mr Toepfer (defendant; cross-claimant)
CGU Insurance Limited (1st cross-defendant)
Vero Insurance Limited (2nd cross-defendant)
NTI Limited (3rd cross-defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Mr Glissan QC + Mr Manion (plaintiff)
Mr J Saxton & Mr J Davis
Mr Deakin QC + Mr Stockley (cross-defendants)
Solicitors:
Robert Saxton Primrose Dunn solicitors (plaintiff)
Mr B Hedges & Ms L Antoun Walker Hedges & Co solicitors (cross-defendants)
File Number(s): 2009/293003
Judgment
HIS HONOUR: In his first supplementary report, Mr Wiltshire writes that he undertook computer simulations to estimate the reactions developed by the excavator's boom hitting the girder at the northern end of the bridge's lift span. He recounts that in running the computer simulations he used the computer resources of the Pacific ESI Pty Ltd and was assisted by Alan Chhor of Pacific ESI, who was responsible for setting up the computer model and running the software used to simulate various impact scenarios.
Mr Glissan QC contends that without material from Mr Chhor as to the part that he played in the exercise undertaken by Mr Wiltshire the report should not be admitted, as the plaintiff cannot evaluate and test the cogency of the conclusions expressed by Mr Wiltshire.
On the other hand, Mr Deakin QC points out that Mr Wiltshire was responsible for, inter alia, checking the correctness of the inputs to the computer model and the reliability of the output.
Section 135 Evidence Act 1995 relevantly provides:
"The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:
(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party".
The danger of unfair prejudice in the present circumstances may only arise, in my opinion, if there is a challenge by the plaintiff to the software used to simulate the various impact scenarios. This software is apparently known as PamCrash. This is a very different case to that referred to by Mr Glissan in KylukPty Ltd v Chief Executive, Office of Environment and Heritage [2013] NSWCCA 114, where the evidence of the expert was dependent upon particle size analyses and a chain of possession, which were not in evidence.
In the present matter, whilst Mr Wiltshire makes use of the PamCrash software, he was responsible for the impact conditions to be simulated, for the interrogation and interpretation of the analysis results, the checking of the correctness of the inputs to the computer model and the reliability of the output.
I did not understand from Mr Glissan's submissions that there is a challenge to the PamCrash software itself.
Accordingly, the probative value of the evidence, which is significant, is not substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff.
The supplementary report is admitted into evidence as exhibit CD 16.
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- AGLC
- Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving and Land Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2013] NSWSC 1514
- Case
- [2013] NSWSC 1514
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the discretion to exclude evidence under section 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) should be exercised in this instance. Specifically, the court needed to assess whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the court. The evidence in question involved internal emails and communications within the plaintiff's organisation, which the defendant argued should not be admissible as it was prejudicial and irrelevant to the issues at hand.
The court considered the nature of the evidence and its potential impact on the trial's fairness and accuracy. The court recognised the importance of ensuring that evidence presented does not unfairly prejudice the defendant or confuse the issues. After weighing the probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice, the court determined that the discretion to exclude the evidence should be exercised. The court found that the internal communications did not significantly contribute to establishing a fact in issue and were more likely to mislead the jury rather than assist in their understanding of the case.
The court excluded the contested evidence from the trial, ensuring that the proceedings remained fair and focused on the relevant issues. The court's decision helped to maintain the integrity of the trial process and provided a balanced approach to the admissibility of evidence in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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