Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Ung

Case [2004] FCAFC 54


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services v Ung
[2004] FCAFC 54

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & COMMUNITY SERVICES v LAY-MINH UNG

No S 626 of 2003

TAMBERLIN, SACKVILLE & FINN JJ
ADELAIDE
10 MARCH 2004

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 626 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
APPLICANT

AND:

LAY-MINH UNG
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

TAMBERLIN, SACKVILLE AND FINN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2004

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        By consent, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 626 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
APPLICANT

AND:

LAY-MINH UNG
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

TAMBERLIN, SACKVILLE AND FINN JJ

DATE:

10 MARCH 2004

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) from a decision of the Tribunal raises a like issue to that raised by the applicant in Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services v Matheson [2004] FCAFC 53.

  2. The respondent was in receipt of youth allowance, a benefit payable under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (“the Act”). The applicant-Secretary considered Mr Ung had received payment to which he was not entitled for a particular period. The Secretary’s decision to raise and recover a debt for the overpayment gave rise to the process of administrative review leading to the Tribunal’s decision.

  3. As in Matheson, Mr Ung was undertaking a degree course at the University of South Australia and the like question raised was whether he satisfied the activity test of Part 2.11 of the Act throughout the period in question: the Act, s 540. This in turn involved an examination of whether in respect of that period he was “undertaking full-time study”: s 541(1)(a). This formula was itself defined for the Act’s purposes in s 541B(1).

  4. The submissions made to the Tribunal in this matter were the same as those made to the same Tribunal Member in Ms Matheson’s case.  A like conclusion was reached in both cases.  On this appeal the same submissions were made as in Matheson.  We in turn have reached a like conclusion to that in Matheson.  Reference should be made to our reasons in that decision.

  5. However, it is necessary that we make the following observations. Section 541B(1) of the Act, in defining “undertaking full-time study” requires a person amongst other things to be:

    (i)enrolled in a course of education at an educational institution: s 541B(1)(a)(i); and

    (ii)“undertaking in the particular study period … for which he or she is enrolled for the course”:  s 541B(1)(b)(i);  at least three-quarters of the normal amount of full-time study in respect of the course for that period:  s 541B(1)(b)(iii).

  6. In Matheson we endorsed the view of the Tribunal (which was reiterated by the Tribunal in the decision under appeal) that the question of what was “the particular study period” in a given case was a question of fact, assuming of course that the Tribunal did not misconstrue the words of legislation.  We need not repeat here our reasons for that view.

  7. The factual circumstances in this matter differ from those in Matheson.  Nonetheless, the fact finding made by the Tribunal was adverse to what was pressed by the Secretary and resulted in Mr Ung being found to be undertaking full-time study for the period in issue.

  8. We were not taken to the facts of this matter in any detail.  Nonetheless we consider it necessary to indicate that, as in Matheson, we consider that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal as to “the particular study period” for the purposes of s 541B(1)(b)(i) was one reasonably open to it on the facts.

    CONCLUSION

  9. We order that the appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed. 

I certify that the preceding nine (9) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Tamberlin, Sackville and Finn.

Associate:

Dated:             10 March 2004

Counsel for the Applicant: R Sallis
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Respondent: S D Ower
Solicitor for the Respondent: Welfare Rights Centre (SA), Inc.
Date of Hearing: 27 February 2004
Date of Judgment: 10 March 2004
Details
AGLC
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Ung [2004] FCAFC 54
Case
[2004] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Ung, the parties involved were the Secretary of the Department of Family and Community Services as the appellant and Ung as the respondent. The nature of the dispute centred around a specific interpretation of a statutory provision, namely section 541B(1)(b)(i) of a relevant legislation, which was pertinent to determining the particular study period for the purposes of the case. This appeal was heard and determined in the relevant court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the interpretation of the statutory language and the determination of the relevant study period as defined by the legislation. The court was tasked with examining whether the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the particular study period was reasonable and supported by the facts presented. This involved an analysis of the statutory language and the application of relevant legal principles to the facts of the case.

The court found that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal as to the particular study period was one that was reasonably open to it, based on the facts of the case. The reasoning involved a careful examination of the statutory language and the application of established legal principles to the specific facts. The court upheld the Tribunal's interpretation, deeming it to be reasonable and appropriate given the circumstances. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was awarded costs.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. By consent, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. By consent, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

We were not taken to the facts of this matter in any detail. Nonetheless we consider it necessary to indicate that, as in Matheson, we consider that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal as to “the particular study period” for the purposes of s 541B(1)(b)(i) was one reasonably open to it on the facts.CONCLUSION We order that the appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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