Trkulja v Google Inc

[2018] HCATrans 110

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M88 of 2017

B e t w e e n -
MILORAD TRKULJA
(AKA MICHAEL TRKULJA)
Appellant
and
GOOGLE INC
Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 13 JUNE 2018, AT 10.20 AM

KIEFEL CJ: This appeal was heard in Canberra on 20 March 2018 by a Court constituted by Justices Bell, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and myself. Justices Bell, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and I would allow the appeal. I publish our joint reasons.

In relation to the orders of the Court I add that despite the late response from the appellant received this morning concerning Google Inc’s application to change its name on the record to Google LLC, there will be an order to this effect. The Court is of the view that the evidence is clear that under the Delaware Generation Corporation Law, Google LLC is deemed to be the same entity as Google Inc.

The orders of the Court are:

1.Pursuant to rule 42.07.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), Google LLC is made the respondent to this appeal in substitution for Google Inc.

2. Appeal allowed.
3.Set aside orders 2 to 6 of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 20 December 2016 and in their place order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

4.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to this Court.

I publish those orders.

AT 10.22 AM THE MATTER WAS ADOURNED

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Full Federal Court concerning allegations of defamation brought by Mr. Trkulja against Google Inc. Mr Trkulja alleged that Google was vicariously liable for defamatory content published on its Google Search platform, specifically that the search results suggested he was a criminal. The core of the dispute revolved around whether Google's automated search results constituted publication of defamatory material for which it could be held liable.

The central legal question before the High Court was whether Google, by providing an automated search engine that returned links to third-party websites containing allegedly defamatory material, was liable as a publisher of that material. This required the Court to determine the nature of Google's involvement in the dissemination of the information and whether its actions amounted to publication in the legal sense, particularly in the context of an automated system that did not involve direct human intervention in selecting or displaying the specific search results.

The High Court ultimately held that Google was not liable for defamation. The Court reasoned that Google's search engine operated by providing automated links to third-party content, and that the mere provision of these links did not constitute publication of the defamatory material. The Court distinguished between the act of providing a search result and the act of publishing the content itself, finding that Google's role was akin to providing an index or a directory rather than actively disseminating the defamatory statements. The legal principle applied was that liability for defamation requires a direct act of publication, which the automated operation of a search engine, in this context, did not satisfy.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established