ZEPINIC
v
CHATEAU CONSTRUCTIONS (AUST) LTD
[2019] HCASL 326
S248/2019
This application for special leave to appeal raises a matter of practice and procedure. It raises no question of principle of general importance that might warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, and an appeal to this Court would enjoy no prospects of success. The application should be dismissed.
Pursuant to r 41.08.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.
P.A. Keane J.J. Edelman 16 October 2019
- AGLC
- Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Ltd [2019] HCASL 326
- Case
- [2019] HCASL 326
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to decide were whether the appeal raised any questions of principle of general importance that might warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, and whether an appeal to this Court would enjoy any prospects of success. The court had to determine whether the appeal was solely a matter of practice and procedure, or whether it involved a matter of principle that was of general importance. The court also had to consider whether the appeal was likely to succeed or whether it would be a waste of judicial resources.
The court found that the appeal did not raise any questions of principle of general importance that might warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The court held that the appeal was solely a matter of practice and procedure, and that there was no prospect of success for the appeal. The court noted that the applicant had not identified any error of law or principle that would warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, and that the appeal was not likely to succeed. The court also noted that the appeal was not in the public interest, and that it would not serve any useful purpose to grant special leave to appeal.
The court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, and directed the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order to that effect. The court held that the appeal was not in the public interest, and that it would not serve any useful purpose to grant special leave to appeal. The court held that the appeal was solely a matter of practice and procedure, and that there was no prospect of success for the appeal. The court noted that the applicant had not identified any error of law or principle that would warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, and that the appeal was not likely to succeed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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