David v TFAC Limited

Case [2009] NZCA 354


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA26/2008
[2009] NZCA 354

BETWEENSUSAN ELIZABETH DAVID


First Appellant

ANDUAR LIMITED


Second Appellant

ANDTFAC LIMITED


First Respondent

ANDGEOFFREY ALAN GRISDALE AND AMANDA MARY GRISDALE


Second Respondents

Court:Arnold, Potter and Harrison JJ

Counsel:C Walker for First and Second Appellants


D Connor For First and Second Respondents

Judgment:13 August 2009 at  4 pm 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The second appellant is entitled to judgment against the first and second respondents on its counter-claims against them.  In case the parties are unable to agree the form of the order(s), we reserve leave to apply.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Arnold J)

[1] In our earlier judgment on this appeal ([2009] NZCA 440) we left open the question of the counterclaims brought by the second appellant, UAR Limited (UAR), against the first and second respondents, TFAC Limited (TFAC) and Mr and Mrs Grisdale (the Grisdales) (at [68] – [73]). In those claims UAR sought payment of various amounts under TFAC’s regional master franchise (RMF) agreement and of costs. UAR’s claim against TFAC relied on TFAC’s wrongful repudiation of the RMF agreement and its claim against the Grisdales was made under their guarantee.

[2]       Mr Connor for TFAC and the Grisdales had offered no submissions on this aspect of the case.  Although we accepted that, in principle, UAR was entitled to judgment on its counter-claims, we raised the question whether there was an obligation to mitigate and called for further submissions. 

[3]       The parties have provided their further submissions.  Mr Walker accepted that UAR could only recover in respect of such loss as it could not have avoided by taking reasonable steps.  However, he raised two points, one substantive and one procedural, which he submitted meant that the principle of mitigation had no application in the present case. 

[4]       The substantive reason was that the supply of regional franchise areas exceeded the demand for regional franchises.  He said that there was no basis to say that UAR would have sold all available franchises within the ten-year term of the TFAC’s RMF agreement.  Accordingly, that agreement would have run its course, and all the payments due under it would have been payable.  The procedural reason was that the onus was on the respondents to raise and prove a failure to mitigate.  They did not plead such a failure nor did they offer any relevant evidence.  Accordingly, there was no proper basis for this Court to deal with the point, or to remit it to the High Court for resolution.

[5]       For his part, Mr Connor advised that the respondents had made an informed and fully advised decision not to raise the issue of mitigation at trial or on appeal.  He nevertheless went on to make some brief submissions, among them the submission that the minimum fees which TFAC was obliged to pay under the RMF agreement were penal in nature and therefore unenforceable, relying on General Finance Acceptance Ltd v Melrose [1988] 1 NZLR 465 (HC).

[6]       Given that the respondents made a deliberate and fully advised decision not to raise and argue a failure to mitigate, we accept Mr Walker’s submission that it is inappropriate for us to address the matter or to refer it back to the High Court for further factual findings.  Accordingly, we consider that we have no alternative but to enter judgment for UAR on its counter-claims.

[7]       We are not able to identify the precise amount of those claims.  If the parties are unable to reach agreement on the form of the order(s), there is leave to apply. 

Solicitors:

Gilbert Walker, Auckland for Appellants
Jones Law, Auckland for Respondents

Details
AGLC
David v TFAC Limited [2009] NZCA 354
Case
[2009] NZCA 354
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of David v TFAC Limited, which came before the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, involves Susan Elizabeth David and UAR Limited, who are the appellants, and TFAC Limited and Geoffrey Alan Grisdale and Amanda Mary Grisdale, who are the respondents. The appellants, UAR Limited, had brought counterclaims against the respondents regarding the payment of various amounts under a regional master franchise (RMF) agreement and sought costs. The claims against TFAC were based on the wrongful repudiation of the RMF agreement, while the claims against the Grisdales were made under their guarantee. The central legal issues before the Court were whether UAR was entitled to judgment on its counterclaims and, if so, the extent to which any award should be mitigated.

In its earlier judgment, the Court left open the question of the counterclaims brought by UAR. Although the Court acknowledged that UAR was entitled to judgment in principle, it raised the issue of whether there was an obligation for UAR to mitigate its losses. The respondents, TFAC and the Grisdales, had not submitted on the mitigation issue, but the Court called for further submissions on the matter. After considering the further submissions, the Court found that the respondents had made a deliberate and fully advised decision not to raise the issue of mitigation at trial or on appeal. Given this decision, the Court deemed it inappropriate to address the matter or remit it back to the High Court for resolution. Consequently, the Court concluded that it had no alternative but to enter judgment for UAR on its counterclaims, although the precise amount of those claims could not be identified at that time.

The Court's reasoning hinged on the principle that parties must take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses. However, in this case, UAR argued that it was not feasible to mitigate the losses because the demand for regional franchises did not match the supply of regional franchise areas, and it was unlikely that UAR would have sold all available franchises within the term of the RMF agreement. The Court accepted this argument and found that the respondents did not plead or provide evidence of a failure to mitigate. Therefore, the Court found it inappropriate to address the mitigation issue further. The Court also noted that the respondents had decided not to raise the issue of penal clauses in the RMF agreement, which could have rendered certain minimum fees unenforceable. However, this submission did not affect the Court's decision regarding the counterclaims.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal determined that UAR was entitled to judgment on its counterclaims against TFAC and the Grisdales. The Court noted that if the parties could not agree on the form of the order(s), there was leave to apply for further orders. This decision effectively resolved the dispute regarding the RMF agreement and the counterclaims, leaving the exact quantification of the award to be determined by the parties or through further application to the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.