Davis v Westgate

Case [2025] NZHC 2222


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE

CIV-2025-412-077

[2025] NZHC 2222

UNDER the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

BETWEEN

ARTEMIS INDIGO DELILAH DAVIS

Plaintiff

AND

JOHN ARTHUR WESTGATE

Defendant

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

Ms Davis appears in person

Judgment:

7 August 2025


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN


This judgment was delivered by me on 7 August 2025 at 4.00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

DAVIS v WESTGATE [2025] NZHC 2222 [7 August 2025]

[1]                 Ms Davis filed a claim against the defendant on 30 July 2025 which was followed by a memorandum filed on 1 August 2025 seeking service directions. The particular directions sought were:

I seek direction, by virtue of the High Court Rules 206, r 61.(2), that service shall occur by means of electronic communication to the email address listed above or be given effect by the Registrar of the District Court of Dunedin at the Defendant’s next appearance as counsel, or otherwise by means of post to the Defendant’s listed P.O. Box, by virtue of High Court Rules 2016, r 6.1(c).

[2]No affidavit accompanied the memorandum.

[3]                 In a Minute of 1 August 2025 I refused to make the directions sought, noting that service of the proceeding was to be effected in accordance with r 6.1(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules) unless the defendant agreed to accept service in some other manner under r 6.7.

[4]                 Ms Davis has now filed an application seeking leave to appeal. The grounds upon which leave to appeal is sought are:

1.Paulsen AJ is statutorily prohibited from exercising the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court of New Zealand in this proceeding;

2.Paulsen AJ is incapable of being regarded as being of impartial mind in any proceeding in which [Ms Davis is] a party;

3.notwithstanding flagrant partiality and reckless incompetence, Paulsen AJ has otherwise erred in law when alleging interlocutory applications to be required when seeking service directions while High Court Rules 2016 do not stipulate any such requirement, and

4.the Respondent is failing to respond to emails, refusing to answer phone calls, and otherwise failing to reply to text messages.

[5]                 The requirement to obtain leave to appeal from interlocutory orders is contained in s 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016. The principles that apply to such an application are well established and are set out by the Court of Appeal in Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand.1 The requirement for leave to appeal is a filtering mechanism, to ensure that unmeritorious appeals of no significance to either party or more generally do not delay proceedings in which orders were made.


1      Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand [2020] NZCA 122.

[6]I am not prepared to grant Ms Davis leave to appeal for the following reasons:

(a)I am not prohibited from exercising the powers of an Associate Judge of the High Court;

(b)there is no basis for the assertion that I am incapable of dealing impartially with proceedings in which Ms Davis is a party;

(c)there is no arguable error of law in my decision to refuse Ms Davis’s application for directions as to service; and

(d)the proposed appeal is both unmeritorious and frivolous.

Result

[7]The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.


O G Paulsen Associate Judge

Details
AGLC
Davis v Westgate [2025] NZHC 2222
Case
[2025] NZHC 2222
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Davis v Westgate, the plaintiff, Artemis Indigo Delilah Davis, sought leave to appeal against the Associate Judge's decision to refuse her application for service directions. The defendant, John Arthur Westgate, had not responded to Davis's attempts to serve the proceedings upon him, leading her to seek service directions from the court. The Associate Judge, Paulsen, denied her request, citing the appropriate rules for service of proceedings. Davis subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal, asserting various grounds for her appeal, including the judge's alleged partiality and incompetence.

The court considered the principles governing leave to appeal, emphasizing the importance of filtering out unmeritorious appeals that could unnecessarily delay proceedings. The Associate Judge concluded that Davis's application for leave to appeal was both unmeritorious and frivolous, as there was no basis for the claims of partiality, no arguable error of law in the refusal to grant service directions, and no evidence supporting the allegations of Westgate's refusal to respond. The Associate Judge found that granting leave to appeal would not serve the interests of justice and dismissed the application accordingly.

The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The proceedings were to continue in accordance with the Associate Judge's earlier directions, and the court did not find it necessary to further address the substantive merits of Davis's claims against Westgate at that stage.

Orders

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