Dunstan

Case [2025] NZSC 22


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

 SC 1/2025
 [2025] NZSC 22
IN THE MATTER OF

TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN
Applicant

Court:

Glazebrook, Ellen France and Williams JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
D J Perkins and O Kiel for Attorney‑General as Applicant to Intervene

Judgment:

27 March 2025

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application by the Attorney‑General for leave to intervene is granted. 

BThe Registrar is to set a timetable for submissions.

C        Ms Dunstan’s application for the orders set out below at [5] is dismissed. 

DThe application for recusal is dismissed.

ECosts are reserved.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Background

  1. On 6 January 2025, Ms Dunstan applied for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Re Dunstan, which dismissed her appeal against orders made under s 166 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 restricting her from commencing or continuing civil proceedings.[1]

Application for leave to intervene by the Attorney-General

[1]Re Dunstan [2024] NZCA 683 (Courtney, Mander and Osborne JJ).

  1. The Attorney‑General applies for leave to intervene on the following grounds:

    (a)The general order made against Ms Dunstan restrains her from commencing or continuing civil proceedings against any party in a senior court, another court or a tribunal.  The Attorney‑General is well‑placed to assist the Court by acting as contradictor, given:

    (i)the Attorney-General’s statutory role in relation to applications for general orders; and

    (ii)the Attorney-General represents the public interest;

    (b)Crown parties were respondents to many of the proceedings relied upon by the High Court when making the general order; and

    (c)Ms Dunstan is a litigant in person.  The Attorney‑General would be able to assist the Court with matters of law.

  2. The Attorney-General was an intervener in the Court of Appeal.

  3. Ms Dunstan opposes the application for leave to intervene.  She says that the Attorney‑General is not a party to the proceeding and alleges that there have been various failures in the past with regard to Crown counsel that mean the application should not be granted.

Application by Ms Dunstan for orders

  1. Ms Dunstan applies for orders:

    (a)adding as parties two other persons who are subject to orders under s 166;

    (b)adding the Attorney‑General as the respondent;

    (c)appointing Mr Ellis as intervener; and

    (d)appointing Mr Clee as amicus curiae.

  2. It is not clear whether or not the persons referred to in [5(a), (c) and (d)] have been informed of Ms Dunstan’s application.

Recusal

  1. Ms Dunstan has also asked for Glazebrook, Ellen France and Miller JJ to recuse themselves.

Decision on intervention of the Attorney-General

  1. It is appropriate to grant the application for leave to intervene for the reasons set out by the Attorney‑General.  We note in particular that, without the Attorney‑General’s intervention, there would be no contradictor.

Decision on application for other orders

  1. It is not appropriate that the persons referred to at [5(a)] be added as parties.  They were not parties to the appeal in the Court of Appeal.  In any event, the fact that they too are subject to s 166 orders does not give them a proper interest in Ms Dunstan’s appeal.

  2. The Attorney-General was not the respondent in the Court of Appeal.  It is not appropriate that the Attorney-General be made the respondent in this Court.

  3. If Mr Ellis wishes to intervene then he will need to file an application for leave to do so.

  4. We do not consider the Court will be assisted at the leave stage by the appointment of amicus curiae.  Ms Dunstan may renew her application if leave is granted.

Decision on recusal

  1. There is no proper basis for the judges to recuse themselves. 

Result

  1. The application by the Attorney-General for leave to intervene is granted.

  2. The Registrar is to set a timetable for submissions.

  3. Ms Dunstan’s application for the orders set out above at [5] is dismissed. 

  4. The application for recusal is dismissed.

  5. Costs are reserved.

Solicitors:
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna ǀ Crown Law Office, Wellington for Attorney-General as Applicant to Intervene


Details
AGLC
Dunstan [2025] NZSC 22
Case
[2025] NZSC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Tanya Felicity Dunstan applied for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Dunstan, which upheld orders restricting her from commencing or continuing civil proceedings. The Attorney-General sought leave to intervene, arguing that they could act as contradictor due to their statutory role and representation of the public interest. Dunstan opposed the intervention, citing past failures involving Crown counsel. Dunstan also sought to add additional parties to the proceedings, appoint an intervener and an amicus curiae, and requested the recusal of certain judges. The court granted the Attorney-General’s application for leave to intervene, noting that they would otherwise be the only contradictor. However, the court dismissed Dunstan’s application to add new parties, appoint an intervener or an amicus curiae, and rejected the recusal application, finding no proper basis for the judges to recuse themselves.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Attorney-General should be granted leave to intervene, whether new parties should be added to the proceedings, whether an intervener and an amicus curiae should be appointed, and whether the judges should recuse themselves. The court held that the Attorney-General should be granted leave to intervene as contradictor, as they were well-placed to assist the court given their statutory role and representation of the public interest. However, the court dismissed the other applications, finding that the new parties did not have a proper interest in the appeal, that an intervener and amicus curiae would not assist at the leave stage, and that there was no proper basis for the judges to recuse themselves.

The Supreme Court granted the Attorney-General’s application for leave to intervene and ordered the Registrar to set a timetable for submissions. The court dismissed the other applications by Dunstan, including the application to add new parties, appoint an intervener or an amicus curiae, and for the judges to recuse themselves. Costs were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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