IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
CIV-2010-419-587 [2014] NZHC 2663
IN THE MATTER of the Insolvency Act 2006 AND IN THE MATTER
of the bankruptcy of CHRISTOPHER LOUIS FAWCETT
Hearing: 28 October 2014 Appearances:
P V Cornege for Official Assignee
C L Fawcett in personJudgment:
29 October 2014
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE J DOOGUE
RE FAWCETT [2014] NZHC 2663 [29 October 2014]
[1] Mr Fawcett was adjudicated bankrupt on 15 September 2010. He would have been discharged from bankruptcy after three years but the Official Assignee opposed his discharge. That led to a hearing before Peters J on 11 December 2013, in which the Judge considered whether or not Mr Fawcett should be discharged from bankruptcy taking into account, amongst other things, the grounds of opposition which the Official Assignee put forward.
[2] The Official Assignee has brought criminal proceedings against Mr Fawcett alleging that he has acted in contravention of s 149 of the Insolvency Act 2006 by carrying on a business while bankrupt. Those charges have yet to be heard.
[3] The outcome of the decision in the High Court was that Justice Peters
dismissed Mr Fawcett’s application for discharge in a judgment she gave on 7 May
2014. The Judge also directed, pursuant to s 298(1)(e) of the Act that:
Mr Fawcett may make a fresh application for discharge on the earlier of the determination of the criminal charges or at any time after 1 December 2014.
[4] Mr Fawcett has made an application for stay of proceedings to the District Court with the essential ground on which that application is based being that the charges were laid by an employee of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment who was not authorised to do so. That application is scheduled to be heard on 5 December 2014.
[5] The position which the Official Assignee takes is therefore that Mr Fawcett has filed an application for discharge which is premature in that it was made before
1 December 2014 or before the date when the criminal charges against him were determined, whichever was the earlier.
[6] Mr Fawcett says that he seeks “an indulgence” from the Court to nonetheless entertain the application for discharge. He says that the Official Assignee has deliberately delayed the hearing of the charges so as to prejudice Mr Fawcett by causing further delays to when he can make an application for discharge. He says for that reason the Court should overlook the fact that the current application for discharge was contrary to the literal terms of the order which Peters J made.
[7] Counsel for the Official Assignee, Mr Cornege, referred me to the provisions of s 294 of the Insolvency Act which provides as follows:
294 Bankrupt may apply for discharge
(1) The bankrupt may at any time apply to the Court for an order of discharge from bankruptcy.
(2) However, if the Court has previously refused an application by the bankrupt for a discharge, and has specified the earliest date when the bankrupt may again apply, the bankrupt must not apply before that date.
(3) The hearing of the application must be in accordance with section
177.
[8] Mr Cornege specifically drew my attention to the provisions of ss 2. That subsection, Mr Cornege said, was mandatory in its terms and it says that the bankrupt “must not apply” before the earliest date specified in the Court judgment. Therefore, he submitted, the Court has no basis for hearing the current application filed as it was, in contravention of s 294(2), Mr Cornege argued.
[9] I consider that the position which the Official Assignee takes is correct.
[10] The wording of s 294(2) is, as Mr Cornege says, mandatory. It would be wrong in principle for a Court to entertain an application which has been filed in contravention of that subsection. It is not a matter of the Court showing some “indulgence” to Mr Fawcett. The Court does not have any discretion to over-ride the requirements of a statute in the way proposed.
[11] Further, the issue of whether the Official Assignee has impeded early resolution by the Court of the charges against Mr Fawcett is not a matter that the Court can go into. I should add, that there is no evidence that the Official Assignee has taken such a course. But even assuming that he had, the fact is that the provisions of s 294(2) do not make an exception for circumstances of the kind about which Mr Fawcett complains, namely that the Official Assignee has caused delays in disposing of the charges which it has brought against Mr Fawcett.
[12] For those reasons I consider that the Court does not have any authority to enquire into an application for discharge from adjudication which has been filed in contravention of the requirements of the judgment which Peters J gave and
accordingly it must be dismissed.
J P Doogue
Associate Judge
- AGLC
- Fawcett [2014] NZHC 2663
- Case
- [2014] NZHC 2663
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether Mr Fawcett's application for discharge from bankruptcy, filed before the earlier of the determination of the criminal charges or 1 December 2014, could be entertained despite being filed prematurely. The Official Assignee argued that Mr Fawcett's application contravened section 294(2) of the Insolvency Act, which stipulates that a bankrupt must not apply for discharge before the earliest date specified by the Court in a previous judgment. Mr Fawcett argued that the Official Assignee had deliberately delayed the hearing of the charges to prejudice him, and that the court should overlook the contravention of the Court's previous order.
The court found that the Official Assignee's position was correct. The court held that section 294(2) is mandatory and the court has no authority to entertain an application filed in contravention of that subsection. The court could not consider whether the Official Assignee had impeded early resolution of the charges against Mr Fawcett, as that was not within the scope of the court's inquiry. The court dismissed Mr Fawcett's application for discharge as it was filed contrary to the requirements of the judgment which Peters J gave. The court made no order for costs.
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