IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2024-485-141 [2024] NZHC 2500
BETWEEN STEPHAN JAN HOKKE
Applicant
AND
EX-ATTORNEY-GENERAL (DAVID PARKER)
First Respondent
SOLICITOR-GENERAL
Second Respondent
DEPUTY SOLICITOR-GENERAL (VIRGINIA HARDY)
Third Respondent
DEPUTY SOLICITOR-GENERAL (MADELEINE LARACY)
Fourth Respondent
Hearing: 2 September 2024 Appearances:
A Ghandour for Respondents
Judgment:
2 September 2024
JUDGMENT OF GRAU J
[Application for strike-out]
[1] In February this year, Mr Hokke filed proceedings against the former Attorney- General David Parker, the Solicitor–General, and two Deputy Solicitors-General, contending that the passing of the Abortion Legislation Act 2020 and the Contraception, Sterilization, and Abortion (Safe Areas) Amendment Act 2022 are contrary to the rights protected by the Bill of Rights 1688 and Magna Carta 1297.
HOKKE v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2024] NZHC 2500 [2 September 2024]
[2] On 8 March 2024, I declined to strike out Mr Hokke’s proceedings as an abuse of process pursuant to rr 5.35A and 5.35B of the High Court Rules 2016 (the HCR).1 In that minute, I expressed my view that Mr Hokke’s claim could be struck out by the Court pursuant to r 15.1(1)(a) of the HCR on the basis that it disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action. Mr Hokke was, however, given the opportunity to replead his claim, which he did. Despite my continued reservations, I lifted the stay of proceedings I had ordered on 8 March so that the repleaded statement of claim could be served.2
[3] In my minute of 22 April 2024 lifting the stay, I again warned Mr Hokke that his claim would be amenable to strike out. Today’s decision should be read together with my two prior minutes, where I set out what I could discern in Mr Hokke’s claim and the issues of concern in it. In the interests of brevity, I will not repeat here what has already been discussed in those minutes.
[4] The matter was called before me in the Judge’s Chambers List this morning. Mr Hokke did not appear. Nor had he filed any response, as directed, to the respondents’ memorandum of 7 August 2024 which asked the Court to defer the deadline for filing any statement of defence and to consider striking out the proceeding on its own motion.
[5] The respondents’ position is that the Court should now strike out the claim. Their view is that Mr Hokke’s pleadings do not disclose any cause of action to which the respondents could even respond. In other words, drafting a statement of defence would be impossible.
[6] I agree. For the same reasons I set out in my two previous minutes, Mr Hokke’s pleadings do not disclose any discernible cause of action. The short point is that the Court cannot grant relief that seeks to affect the legislative process, and this is what is sought by Mr Hokke. It would be “manifestly unfair” to require the respondents to respond to the application in circumstances where the claim is simply untenable and
1 Hokke v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2024-485-141, 8 March 2024 (Minute of Grau J).
2 Hokke v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2024-485-141, 22 April 2024 (Minute (No. 2) of Grau J).
permitting Mr Hokke’s application to proceed further would constitute poor control of Court processes.3
[7] Pursuant to r 15.1(1)(a) of the HCR, I make an order striking out Mr Hokke’s claim accordingly.
Grau J
Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington for Respondents
3 O’Neill v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2023] NZCA 152 at [27] and [30].
- AGLC
- Hokke v Ex-Attorney-General [2024] NZHC 2500
- Case
- [2024] NZHC 2500
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court reviewed Hokke’s pleadings and found that they did not disclose a discernible cause of action. The claim sought to affect the legislative process, which the Court cannot do. Grau J had previously declined to strike out the proceedings but allowed Hokke to replead his claim. Despite this opportunity, Hokke failed to respond to the respondents’ memorandum, leading the respondents to request a strike-out of the claim. The Court agreed with the respondents that Hokke’s claim was untenable and that requiring the respondents to respond would constitute an abuse of process and poor control of Court processes.
In light of the untenable nature of Hokke’s claim, Grau J struck out the application pursuant to r 15.1(1)(a) of the High Court Rules 2016. The Court held that it would be manifestly unfair to require the respondents to respond to an application that lacked any viable cause of action. The decision underscores the Court's role in ensuring that legal proceedings are not used to improperly influence legislative matters. The Court's order effectively terminates Hokke’s proceedings against the respondents.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Legal Principle Established
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