Kathryn Frances Boswell v Owen Ross Millar

Case [2014] NZSC 136


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 79/2014
[2014] NZSC 136
BETWEEN

KATHRYN FRANCES BOSWELL
Applicant

AND

OWEN ROSS MILLAR
Respondent

Court:

Elias CJ, William Young and Arnold JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
S J Chatwin for Respondent

Judgment:

7 October 2014

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

BThe applicant is to pay the respondent costs of $2,500 and reasonable disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. These proceedings arose out of the settlement of a dispute between the applicant and the late Mr Owen Millar about an option to purchase in favour of the applicant over part of a property owned by Mr Millar over which the applicant had a lease.  Under the settlement agreement, the applicant was to purchase the land in dispute but this required the issue of a separate title which required either a resource consent for a subdivision or a boundary adjustment.  The agreement provided for the parties to co-operate in applying for a subdivision consent but that if one could not be obtained, the transaction would proceed, at the applicant’s option, as a boundary adjustment. 

  2. Relevantly in issue in the High Court[1] and Court of Appeal[2] were claims by the applicant involving:

    (a)An alleged breach by Mr Millar of his duty to co-operate in relation to the subdivision consent application;

    (b)The applicant’s contention that when Mr Millar entered the settlement agreement he knew that a subdivision consent would not be obtained;

    (c)Claims for damages to recover the applicant’s costs in relation to the resolution of other disputes in respect of the settlement agreement which had been settled; and

    (d)A claim for a refund of rent paid of $5,250.

A claim by Mr Millar for interest or rent on the purchase price was dismissed by the Judge in the High Court and was not the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

[1]Boswell v Millar [2013] NZHC 703, [2014] 3 NZLR 332.

[2]Boswell v Millar [2014] NZCA 314, [2014] 3 NZLR 332.

  1. On the four primary issues in the case, the applicant was unsuccessful in both the High Court and Court of Appeal.  In relation to the first two, this was substantially on the facts.[3]  In respect of the third, both Courts applied the well-established rule that in general legal costs incurred in relation to disputes are not able to be recovered as damages.  The fourth claim required an interpretation of the lease and settlement agreement.  Both Courts resolved that issue against the applicant.

    [3]We accept that the factual issue in respect of the first issue fell to be determined in the context of an assessment of what was required under the co-operation agreement.

  2. The case arises out of very particular contractual arrangements.  There is no point of public or general commercial importance involved.  As well, the applicant’s arguments have received thorough consideration in both the High Court and Court of Appeal and there is no appearance of a miscarriage of justice.

Solicitors:
Chatwin Legal Limited, Hamilton for Respondent


Details
AGLC
Kathryn Frances Boswell v Owen Ross Millar [2014] NZSC 136
Case
[2014] NZSC 136
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kathryn Frances Boswell, the applicant, filed an appeal against Owen Ross Millar, the respondent, in the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The dispute stems from a settlement agreement regarding an option to purchase a part of a property owned by the late Mr Millar, over which the applicant had a lease. The agreement stipulated that the applicant would purchase the land in question, but this required either a resource consent for a subdivision or a boundary adjustment. The applicant claimed that Mr Millar breached his duty to cooperate in the subdivision consent application and that he knew a subdivision consent would not be obtained. The applicant also sought damages for costs related to resolving other disputes under the settlement agreement and a refund of rent paid. The High Court and Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's claims, and the Supreme Court upheld these decisions.

The primary legal issues the Supreme Court considered were whether Mr Millar breached his duty to cooperate, whether he knew a subdivision consent would not be obtained, whether the applicant could recover legal costs as damages, and whether the applicant was entitled to a refund of rent paid. The Supreme Court found that the applicant's claims were unsuccessful based on the facts and well-established legal principles. The Court of Appeal's interpretation of the lease and settlement agreement was upheld, and the applicant's claims for damages and rent refund were dismissed.

The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and ruled that the factual issues were determined correctly by the lower courts. The Court found that the applicant's arguments had been thoroughly considered, and there was no indication of a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court also accepted that the interpretation of the lease and settlement agreement was correctly decided by the lower courts. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of $2,500 and reasonable disbursements.

The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and ruled that the factual issues were determined correctly by the lower courts. The Court found that the applicant's arguments had been thoroughly considered, and there was no indication of a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court also accepted that the interpretation of the lease and settlement agreement was correctly decided by the lower courts. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of $2,500 and reasonable disbursements.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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