Koyama v New Zealand Law Society

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

[2014] NZSC 30

BETWEEN	TATSUHIKO KOYAMA Applicant
AND	NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY Respondent

Court:	Glazebrook J
Counsel:	Applicant in person
Judgment:	1 April 2014

JUDGMENT OF GLAZEBROOK J

The application to review the Registrar’s decision is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Mr Tatsuhiko Koyama applies for a review of the Registrar’s decision to decline to accept for filing Mr Koyama’s application for leave to appeal to this Court.

Background

Mr Koyama was refused a certificate of character by the Canterbury District Law Society. Mr Koyama then unsuccessfully applied to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. Mr Koyama appealed against that decision to the High Court where his appeal was dismissed by Dobson J.[1] Kós J refused Mr Koyama leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.[2] Mr Koyama’s subsequent application for special leave was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.[3] In addition to the above litigation, Mr Koyama has filed judicial review proceedings which have yet to be heard.

Application for leave

[1]Koyama v New Zealand Law Society [2012] NZHC 1725.

[2]Koyama v New Zealand Law Society [2012] NZHC 2853.

[3]Koyama v New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZCA 115 (O’Regan P, Wild and White JJ).

The decisions upon which Mr Koyama applies for leave to appeal to this Court are:
(a)On 6 March 2014, Ronald Young J (by minute) refused an application to have Mr Koyama’s judicial review proceedings and his application for recall of Dobson J’s judgment heard together and referred the recall application to Dobson J; and
(b)On 13 March 2014, the recall application was dismissed by Dobson J.[4]
[4]Koyama v New Zealand Law Society HC Wellington CIV-2013-485-6873, 13 March 2014.
The Registrar of this Court refused to accept Mr Koyama’s application for filing in accordance with s 8(c) of the Supreme Court Act 2003, which states that this Court is unable to hear and determine an appeal regarding a High Court decision made on an interlocutory application. Mr Koyama’s main contention in contesting the Registrar’s decision is that the decisions for which he seeks leave to appeal are not decisions made upon interlocutory applications.

Discussion

With regard to Dobson J’s judgment, an application to recall a judgment requires an interlocutory application.[5] Therefore, the judgment of Dobson J on 13 March 2014 was a decision based upon an interlocutory application and an appeal to this Court is thus barred by reason of s 8(c) of the Supreme Court Act.
[5]Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [11.9.01(1)].
With regards to the minute of Ronald Young J of 6 March 2014, this falls within the definition of an ‘interlocutory order’ under High Court rule 1.3 as it was “for the purposes of a proceeding or an intended proceeding”.
This means that both matters covered in Mr Koyama’s applications for leave to appeal to this Court concerned interlocutory matters in the High Court and this Court has no jurisdiction to hear them.[6]

Result

[6]Section 8(c) of the Supreme Court Act.

The application for review of the Registrar’s decision is dismissed.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand considered an application by Tatsuhiko Koyama for a review of the Registrar’s decision to decline to accept his application for leave to appeal to the Court. The application arose from a series of decisions concerning Koyama's refusal of a certificate of character by the Canterbury District Law Society, which had led to multiple unsuccessful appeals and judicial review proceedings. Specifically, Koyama sought to appeal the High Court's dismissal of his appeal and the Court of Appeal's dismissal of his application for special leave. In addition, he sought to appeal the High Court's decision to decline to hear his application for judicial review together with his application for recall of the High Court's judgment and the subsequent dismissal of the recall application.

The legal issue before the Court was whether the decisions Koyama sought to appeal were interlocutory in nature, thereby barring an appeal to the Supreme Court under section 8(c) of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The Court found that the decision to recall a judgment, as well as the decision to decline to consolidate Koyama's judicial review and recall applications, were both interlocutory. The Court of Appeal's judgment dismissing Koyama's application for special leave was also an interlocutory decision, as it pertained to the process of appeal rather than the substantive merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal regarding these interlocutory decisions.

The Court dismissed Koyama's application for review of the Registrar’s decision, affirming that the decisions in question were indeed interlocutory and that the Supreme Court was therefore unable to hear the appeal under section 8(c) of the Supreme Court Act. The Court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory limitation of its jurisdiction to substantive matters, excluding interlocutory applications. This decision reinforced the principle that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is confined to appeals on the merits of High Court decisions, not on interlocutory matters.

The final order of the Court was that the application to review the Registrar’s decision be dismissed, and the appeal did not proceed further.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established