McClintock v Taupo District Council

Case [2017] NZCA 303


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA98/2017
[2017] NZCA 303

BETWEEN

KENNETH ERNEST MCCLINTOCK
Applicant

AND

TAUPO DISTRICT COUNCIL
Respondent

Court:

Miller, Lang and Mander JJ

Counsel:

Applicant (in person)
J S Gurnick for Respondent

Judgment:

(On the papers)

17 July 2017 at 4.00 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Miller J)

  1. This is an application for leave to bring a second appeal from an order that Mr McClintock’s dog, Scoobie, should be destroyed.[1]  Scoobie is described as an Australian cattle dog cross.[2]

    [1]We adopt Mr McClintock’s spelling of the dog’s name.  In the court papers he is called Scooby. 

    [2]We note that Mr McClintock says the dog is a greyhound cross.

  2. Scoobie has been classified since 2010 as a dangerous dog, meaning that he must be kept within a secure area, or otherwise muzzled and on a lead.[3]  At a time when he was not so secured, he attacked a Mr Rean.  The dog was in a van outside Mr McClintock’s place of work, but the sliding door was open and he was able to get out and bite Mr Rean on the calf as he walked past.  Mr McClintock pleaded guilty to charges under ss 32 (failure to comply with classification as a dangerous dog) and 57 (being the owner of a dog that attacks someone) of the Dog Control Act 1996.  

    [3]Under the Dog Control Act 1996.

  3. Both sections require the court to make an order for the destruction of the dog unless satisfied that the circumstances of the offence were exceptional and do not warrant the dog’s destruction.[4]  The courts below have held that there were no exceptional circumstances that might warrant saving the dog.  Mr McClintock challenges these conclusions.

    [4]Dog Control Act, ss 32(3) and 57(3).

  4. A disputed facts hearing was held in the District Court to consider whether there were exceptional circumstances.  Judge MacKenzie heard evidence from Mr McClintock and Mr Rean and a dog expert called for the defence, Ms Flint. The Judge found that there were no exceptional circumstances.[5]  On appeal, Katz J agreed.[6]

    [5]Taupo District Council v McClintock [2016] NZDC 14885.

  5. It has not been suggested that the courts below misdirected themselves in law, and it makes no difference whether “exceptional circumstances” has a different meaning in s 32 than it does in s 57, since both apply.[7]  Mr McClintock wants to appeal on the facts. 

    [7]Halliday v New Plymouth District Council HC New Plymouth CRI-2005-443-11, 14 July 2005.

  6. Mr McClintock admits that Scoobie was not secured but says that was from his own inadvertence.  He claims that Mr Rean kicked Scoobie, so provoking the attack, and suffered only a nip that did not require medical treatment.  He alleges that the dog acted in self-defence and Mr Rean lied in his evidence.  He says that the dog is of good temperament and is devoted to children.  He denies that Scoobie is a dangerous dog, saying the classification is based on a previous false complaint.  He complains that the Council told him that the dog would not be destroyed if he got a good report from Ms Flint.  And he seeks mercy, saying that he is 76 and in ill-health and Scoobie means everything to him.

  7. Mr McClintock’s claims were carefully considered and persuasively rejected in the courts below.  They held, correctly, that he could not revisit the dog’s classification as a defence to the s 32 charge.

  8. A second appeal is by leave under s 253 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.  The Court must be satisfied that there is an issue of general or public importance or that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.

  9. We identify no issue of sufficient importance to justify a second appeal.  In particular, we can see no possibility that the Court would interfere with the findings that Scoobie was not secured when Mr Rean walked past — Mr McClintock accepts that the van door had been left open — and that he attacked without provocation.  Nor, as the courts below also found, would it make any difference.  There can be no excuse for not having the dog secured.  Mr Rean did require medical attention.  On the most generous view of events, there is nothing sufficiently exceptional about the circumstances of the offences to warrant saving a dog already classified as dangerous.  It seems plain that Scoobie has an over-developed territorial instinct.  And while we accept that he is a much-loved family pet whose fate may exacerbate Mr McClintock’s health difficulties, that is not an exceptional circumstance either. 

  10. Accordingly, we are not satisfied that there may be a miscarriage of justice.

  11. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Tompkins Wake, Hamilton for Respondent


Details
AGLC
McClintock v Taupo District Council [2017] NZCA 303
Case
[2017] NZCA 303
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal of New Zealand dealt with an application for leave to appeal by Kenneth Ernest McClintock against the Taupo District Council. The dispute centred on an order that Mr McClintock's dog, Scoobie, should be destroyed. Scoobie, an Australian cattle dog cross, had been classified as a dangerous dog since 2010, necessitating that he be kept within a secure area or muzzled and on a lead. The classification resulted from an incident where Scoobie attacked a passerby, Mr Rean, when he escaped from a van outside Mr McClintock's workplace due to an open sliding door. Mr McClintock pleaded guilty to charges under sections 32 and 57 of the Dog Control Act 1996, which mandate the destruction of the dog unless the court finds exceptional circumstances. Both lower courts held that no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant sparing Scoobie's life.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the application for leave to bring a second appeal should be granted. This hinged on whether there was an issue of general or public importance or if a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Mr McClintock argued that exceptional circumstances existed due to his inadvertent failure to secure Scoobie, the alleged provocation by Mr Rean, the minor nature of the injury, and Scoobie's good temperament. The Court of Appeal considered these arguments and concluded that there was no basis to believe that the lower courts' findings would be overturned. The Court was particularly persuaded by the lack of provocation and the necessity of securing dangerous dogs, regardless of the dog's temperament or the owner's circumstances. The Court found no exceptional circumstances that could justify saving Scoobie, leading to the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to bring a second appeal. The reasoning was that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from the mandatory destruction order for Scoobie. The findings of the lower courts that Scoobie was not secured and attacked without provocation were deemed conclusive. The Court found no evidence of a miscarriage of justice or an issue of general or public importance that would warrant a second appeal. Therefore, the decision to destroy Scoobie was upheld.

Orders

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Background

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