McGuire v Secretary for Justice

[2018] NZCA 167

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA118/2017
 [2018] NZCA 167

BETWEEN	JEREMY JAMES MCGUIRE Applicant
AND	THE SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE Respondent

Court:	French, Miller, Cooper, Winkelmann and Clifford JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person G L Melvin and M J McKillop for Respondent P N Collins for New Zealand Law Society as Intervener
Judgment: (On the papers)	25 May 2018 at 11.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall is declined.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Cooper J)

1. In the Court’s judgment of 9 March 2018 there was an order that the applicant pay the respondent costs on the appeal, and costs on the cross‑appeal, calculated for a standard appeal on a band A basis and usual disbursements.[1]

   [1]McGuire v The Secretary for Justice [2018] NZCA 37 at [78].

2. In a memorandum dated 23 March 2018 Mr McGuire takes issue with the award of costs, on two bases.  First, he says that the appeal involved the public interest, and a full panel was convened to hear it, the New Zealand Law Society being asked to appear as an intervener.  He submits in the circumstances that the usual costs rules were thereby “displaced”.  The second issue advanced is that the cross‑appeal was filed and served out of time and the Secretary for Justice was granted an indulgence to enable the cross‑appeal to proceed.

3. Counsel for the respondent, by memorandum dated 5 April 2018, challenges both of Mr McGuire’s propositions.

4. In accordance with the Court’s normal practice, we invited submissions on what costs orders (if any) should be made on disposal of the appeal, at the end of the oral argument.  It was then agreed by both counsel that costs should follow the event and that the costs should be calculated for a standard appeal on a band A basis.

5. Counsel for the respondent suggests that Mr McGuire’s present memorandum effectively amounts to a recall application.  It is not so expressed.  But if that is what it is intended to be, it is clearly unmeritorious.  There is no proper basis upon which we could now purport to make some different order as to costs than the one that was made in the judgment.

6. Assuming in Mr McGuire’s favour that the memorandum is an application for recall, it is declined.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent