IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
CIV-2012-454-547 [2013] NZHC 1002
UNDER the Judicature Act 1908, the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, the District Courts Rules 1992 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
IN THE MATTER OF an application for review
AND
IN THE MATTER OF an application for a declaration invalidating a distress warrant issued by the Palmerston North District Court, a declaration determining liability under probate and for orders for the return of property
BETWEEN JAMES ROBERT REID Applicant
ANDROSE CITY FUNERAL HOME LTD First Respondent
ANDPALMERSTON NORTH DISTRICT COURT
Second Respondent
Hearing: On the papers
Counsel: R W Groot for Second Respondent
Judgment: 7 May 2013
In accordance with r 11.5 I direct that the delivery time of this judgment is 4.15 pm on the 7th day of May 2013.
COSTS JUDGMENT OF MACKENZIE J
REID V ROSE CITY FUNERAL HOME LTD HC PMN CIV-2012-454-547 [7 May 2013]
[1] In an oral judgment delivered on 18 December 2012, I dismissed this proceeding.[1] The second respondent had indicated in its submissions in support of its strike-out application that, if successful, indemnity or increased costs would be sought. Counsel for the second respondent has, on 11 April 2013, filed a memorandum seeking indemnity costs amounting to $11,774.34, including disbursements and GST. The makeup of that sum is set out in the schedule attached
to counsel’s memorandum. That memorandum also notes that scale costs, on a 2B
basis, would amount to $7,964.85, inclusive of disbursements and GST.
[2] Indemnity costs may be awarded under r 14.6(4)(a) of the High Court Rules where a party has acted vexatiously, frivolously, improperly or unnecessarily in commencing, continuing, or defending a proceeding or a step in a proceeding.
[3] The proceedings were purported to be brought by Mr Reid in his capacity as a trustee of the Frederick Frank Trust. The trustees of the Trust are Mr Reid and Mr Hale, both of whom appeared in person at the hearing. The present proceedings were not brought in the name of the Trust, but in the name of Mr Reid. The proceeding sought to challenge a judgment which had been obtained by the first respondent against Mr Hale personally. The second respondent was the District Court at Palmerston North, in which that judgment had been obtained and in which enforcement procedures had been taken.
[4] In my judgment I held that it was absolutely clear beyond argument that the Frederick Frank Trust, and Mr Reid in his capacity as a trustee of that Trust, had no standing to bring the proceedings. The judgment was against Mr Hale in his personal capacity, not in his capacity as a trustee of the Trust.
[5] I am satisfied that Mr Reid acted vexatiously, frivolously and improperly in commencing the proceeding. First, as I have held, the judgment which the proceedings sought to challenge was against Mr Hale personally and not against the
Trust. The assertion that the Trust was involved was, I am satisfied, made so as to
give Mr Reid standing in these proceedings which he would otherwise not have, and which I have held that he did not have.
[6] In considering whether Mr Reid’s actions were vexatious and frivolous, it is permissible to take into account the fact that, after these proceedings were commenced, an order was made under s 88B of the Judicature Act 1908 declaring Mr Reid a vexatious litigant. [2]
[2] Attorney-General v Reid [2012] NZHC 2119, [2012] 3 NZLR 630.
[7] One category of proceedings considered by this Court on the s 88B application is particularly relevant to the present application for costs. The circumstances were described in these terms:[3]
In 2010, Mr Reid became involved in his fourth case category, two cases in which he had no direct interest, each of which had an extensive history and had already been effectively determined. In each he obtained standing by becoming a trustee in an existing trust. He then took charge, setting out to challenge the decisions already given. As in the other categories of case, each of these two cases soon had offshoots, not all of which are completely resolved. Of concern has to be that in one Mr Reid was allowed to take his expenses out of trust money.
[3] At [90].
[8] One of these two cases involved the Frederick Frank Trust. It is described at [272] to [274]. A strike-out application is said to be “still to be decided”.[4] In a judgment delivered on 28 May 2012, I struck out the claim against the Masterton District and High Courts. The claims against those parties bear considerable similarity to the claim against the second respondent in this proceeding. It is clear that the sole reason Mr Reid was appointed as a trustee of the Trust was to enable
him to pursue that proceeding.
[4] At [274].
[9] Mr Reid’s actions in these two cases show a pattern of seeking to intervene in proceedings in which he has no legitimate interest and in which his involvement arises only because of his own vexatiously litigious tendency. Mr Reid’s actions in involving himself as a litigant in proceedings in which he has no personal interest, both in that earlier case and in this case, are vexatious. In this case, this is
compounded by his attempt to involve the Frederick Frank Trust in a case in which
the Trust had no direct interest. These factors support the conclusion that Mr Reid has acted vexatiously in these proceedings, and that they were improperly brought.
[10] Counsel for the second respondent submits that the costs order should be made against Mr Reid personally. I consider that that is appropriate. Mr Reid is the only applicant in these proceedings. The Trust had no interest or involvement in the subject matter of the proceedings and it would be unjust for the Trust to be required to bear any part of the cost burden which Mr Reid’s commencement and pursuit of this proceeding has brought about.
[11] There will be an order against Mr Reid personally that he pay the second respondent indemnity costs in the sum of $11,774.34. He is not entitled to indemnity from the Frederick Frank Trust.
“A D MacKenzie J”
Solicitors: Crown Law Office, Wellington for Second Respondent
Copies to: Mr Reid and Mr Hale
Mr Burt, Rose City Funeral Home Ltd
- AGLC
- Reid v Rose City Funeral Home Ltd [2013] NZHC 1002
- Case
- [2013] NZHC 1002
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether indemnity costs should be awarded to the second respondent under rule 14.6(4)(a) of the High Court Rules. This rule allows for the award of indemnity costs when a party has acted vexatiously, frivolously, improperly, or unnecessarily in commencing, continuing, or defending a proceeding. The court needed to determine whether Mr. Reid's actions in bringing the proceeding met the criteria for such an award.
The court found that Mr. Reid had no legitimate standing to bring the proceedings as a trustee of the Frederick Frank Trust. The judgment he sought to challenge was against Mr. Hale personally, not against the Trust. The court concluded that Mr. Reid's actions were vexatious, frivolous, and improper, particularly given his history of vexatious litigation. This conclusion was supported by a previous declaration made under section 88B of the Judicature Act 1908, which identified Mr. Reid as a vexatious litigant. The court found that Mr. Reid's involvement in the case was driven by his tendency to litigate without a legitimate interest.
Based on these findings, the court awarded indemnity costs to the second respondent in the sum of $11,774.34, to be paid by Mr. Reid personally. The Frederick Frank Trust was not to bear any part of the costs, as it had no interest or involvement in the subject matter of the proceedings. The court's decision underscored the importance of ensuring that legal proceedings are brought with legitimate standing and a genuine interest in the outcome.
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