| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA173/2014 [2014] NZCA 414 |
| BETWEEN | VINCENT ROSS SIEMER |
| AND | JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER |
| RODNEY HANSEN Second Respondent | |
| DAVID HARVEY Third Respondent |
| Counsel: | Appellant in person |
Judgment: (On the papers) | 9 September 2014 at 10.00 am |
JUDGMENT OF WHITE J
AThe application for recall is dismissed.
BThe appellant must pay the first respondent costs calculated as for a standard application on a band A basis and usual disbursements.
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REASONS
In a judgment delivered on 30 July 2014 I declined Mr Siemer’s application for an order that security for costs be dispensed with and dismissed his application for review of the Deputy Registrar’s decision refusing to dispense with security for costs.[1]
Mr Siemer now seeks recall of that judgment. The application is opposed by the Judicial Conduct Commissioner.
The background to Mr Siemer’s applications the subject of my judgment of 30 July 2014 is set out fully in that judgment.
The principles regarding applications for recall of judgments are well‑established. They were conveniently summarised in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2):[2]
Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse subject, of course, to appeal. Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty. There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled – first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statute or regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled.
[2]Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633.
Applying those principles to this case, I am satisfied that there is no basis for a recall of my judgment. There is no suggestion that either the first or second categories referred to in Horowhenua County apply. While Mr Siemer endeavours to rely on other decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, they preceded my judgment. As to the third category, the matters raised by Mr Siemer simply seek to relitigate issues already considered and rejected in my judgment.
The application for recall is accordingly dismissed.
There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. The Judicial Conduct Commissioner was put to the cost of responding to the application.
I accordingly order Mr Siemer to pay the Judicial Conduct Commissioner costs on the recall application calculated as for a standard application on a band A basis and usual disbursements.
Solicitors:
Gault Mitchell Law, Wellington for First Respondent
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Second and Third Respondents
- AGLC
- Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2014] NZCA 414
- Case
- [2014] NZCA 414
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether there were grounds for recalling the earlier judgment. The principles governing recall applications were established in the case of Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2), which outlined three categories where a judgment might be recalled: when there has been an amendment to relevant statutes or new judicial decisions of high authority, when counsel has failed to bring relevant legal provisions or decisions to the court's attention, and when some other special reason of justice necessitates the recall. The court considered whether any of these categories applied to the current situation.
Upon examining the arguments presented by Mr Siemer, the court found no basis for recalling the earlier judgment. There was no indication that any new statutes, regulations, or judicial decisions had been introduced since the original judgment. The matters raised by Mr Siemer aimed to re-litigate issues that had already been addressed and rejected in the earlier judgment. The court concluded that there was no special reason of justice that warranted recalling the judgment. Therefore, the application for recall was dismissed. The court also ordered Mr Siemer to pay the costs of the recall application to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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