Susan Couch v Attorney- General

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 49/2006
[2006] NZSC 66

BETWEENSUSAN COUCH

Appellant

ANDTHE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Respondent

Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard and McGrath JJ
Counsel:B P Henry for Appellant

J C Pike and F E Guy Kidd for Respondent

Judgment:1 September 2006

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A.LEAVE TO APPEAL IS GRANTED.

B.The approved ground is whether the cause of action based on negligence was correctly struck out.

REASONS
[1] We are satisfied that the proposed appeal in relation to the cause of action based on misfeasance in public office cannot succeed and have not granted leave in respect of it. The appellant has not pleaded, and would in any event appear to have no prospect of proving, the requisite elements of such a claim, namely that the official concerned acted deliberately or with advertent recklessness as to the consequences for a person in the general position of the appellant.
[2] The grant of leave relating to the negligence cause of action is intended to encompass both the question of the existence of a duty of care and, if it exists, the question of whether exemplary damages would be available for a claimant alleging breach of such a duty.
Solicitors:
Denis Gates, Whangaparoa for Appellant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Susan Couch appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal that dismissed her claim for damages against the Attorney-General. The case revolved around the issue of whether the Court of Appeal erred in striking out her claims for negligence and misfeasance in public office. The court was required to determine if the appellant had a valid cause of action based on negligence and misfeasance in public office. The court also had to decide if exemplary damages would be available for a breach of a duty of care.

The Supreme Court held that the proposed appeal in relation to the cause of action based on misfeasance in public office could not succeed. The appellant had not pleaded, and would in any event appear to have no prospect of proving, the requisite elements of such a claim, namely that the official concerned acted deliberately or with advertent recklessness as to the consequences for a person in the general position of the appellant. However, the court granted leave to appeal in relation to the negligence cause of action, encompassing both the question of the existence of a duty of care and, if it exists, the question of whether exemplary damages would be available for a claimant alleging breach of such a duty.

The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in relation to the negligence cause of action. The court held that the grant of leave relating to the negligence cause of action was intended to encompass both the question of the existence of a duty of care and, if it exists, the question of whether exemplary damages would be available for a claimant alleging breach of such a duty. The court found that the Court of Appeal had erred in striking out the appellant's claim for negligence. The Supreme Court further held that exemplary damages could be awarded for a breach of a duty of care if the defendant's conduct was outrageous and demonstrated a complete disregard for the rights of the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal for further consideration. The Court of Appeal was directed to consider the appellant's claim for negligence and exemplary damages. The court did not make any orders regarding the claim for misfeasance in public office as the appellant had not pleaded, and would in any event appear to have no prospect of proving, the requisite elements of such a claim.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established