IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV 2014-485-000061 [2014] NZHC 1907
BETWEEN WALTER HORTON TE UA
Plaintiff
LYNETTE STANKOVICH Second Plaintiff
AND
SECRETARY FOR WAR PENSIONS First Defendant
ATTORNEY-GENERAL Second Defendant
Hearing: (On papers) Counsel:
GDS Taylor and M Freeman for Plaintiffs
A Williams and R Garden for DefendantsJudgment:
13 August 2014
COSTS JUDGMENT OF WHATA J
[1] Father Te Ua sought judicial review of various actions by Veteran Affairs New Zealand (VANZ). The pleadings included seven judicial review claims, four negligence claims and three alleged breaches of statutory duty. I dismissed the breaches of statutory duty and negligence claims. But I granted relief in relation to the second, third, fourth and seventh review claims.
[2] I must now resolve the issue of costs. Father Te Ua and Ms Stankovich seek the sum of $52,000 as costs. The defendants submit that costs and disbursements
should lie where they fall.
TE UA v SECRETARY FOR WAR PENSIONS [2014] NZHC 1907 [13 August 2014]
[3] The plaintiffs have been legally aided throughout and Mr Taylor says that this exposes the plaintiffs to a claim from the Legal Services Commissioner for repayment of all or part of the total legal aid paid, in the sum of $53,444.11.
Assessment
[4] Father Te Ua demonstrated that VANZ had not treated his applications with the requisite care and diligence to be expected in the circumstances. This was manifested by (among other things) inordinate delay in progressing and then notifying decisions on his claims, depriving him of an opportunity to be heard in relation to adverse medical opinion, and then depriving Ms Stankovich of an entitlement to some compensation at least for the assistance she rendered to Father Te Ua for the purposes of his treatment.
[5] The Crown, however, successfully defended the negligence and breaches of statutory duty claims and some of the review claims. But I do not consider that provides a sufficient basis in terms of the rules1 to deprive the plaintiffs of their costs. I think a proper balance of the relative success of the plaintiffs is a reduction in costs of 25%.2 The negligence and breach of statutory duty claims were ambitious and added disproportionate cost to the proceedings.
[6] The quantum of the costs claimed is $52,000. That has not been broken down for me in terms of the rules. Rather than make that award at the outset I propose instead to grant costs on a 2B basis less 25%, together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar. If it is necessary to revert to me for the purposes of quantum,
the parties have leave to do so.
1 See especially rr 14.1, 14.2(a) and see Packing In Ltd (in Liquidation) v Chilcott (2003)
16 PRNZ 869 (CA).
2 Pursuant to r 14.7(d).
[7] For completeness, the fact that the plaintiffs are legally aided has not influenced my decision to grant costs. I am not concerned about the source of the payment of costs; only whether costs, properly incurred by the plaintiffs should be awarded in the circumstances of the case.3
Solicitors:
Thomas Dewar Sziranyi Letts, Lower Hutt
Crown Law, Wellington
3 Compare Willis v Attorney General HC Auckland CP11626/88, 14 March 1990.
- AGLC
- Te Ua v Secretary for War Pensions [2014] NZHC 1907
- Case
- [2014] NZHC 1907
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether to award costs to the plaintiffs, given that they had been legally aided throughout the proceedings. This meant that they might be liable to repay all or part of the total legal aid paid by the Legal Services Commissioner. Despite this, the court found that the plaintiffs had achieved a degree of success in their claims, which warranted an award of costs. The court considered the relative success of the plaintiffs and decided that a reduction of 25% in the costs claimed was appropriate, as the negligence and breach of statutory duty claims were ambitious and added disproportionate cost to the proceedings. The court granted costs on a 2B basis, less 25%, along with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
The court emphasised that the source of payment for the costs, whether through legal aid or otherwise, did not influence its decision. The court was concerned only with whether the costs properly incurred by the plaintiffs should be awarded in the circumstances of the case. The plaintiffs were granted leave to revert to the court for the purposes of quantum if necessary.
The final order of the court was that the defendants pay the plaintiffs' costs of the proceedings on a 2B basis less 25%, together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar. This decision balanced the plaintiffs' partial success with the need to reduce the overall costs incurred due to the ambitious nature of some of their claims.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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