IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV 2010-485-497
UNDER Section 146A of the Immigration Act 1987
IN THE MATTER OF an application for judicial review
BETWEEN GORDANA VUKOMANOVIC Appellant
ANDRESIDENCE REVIEW BOARD First Respondent
ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR Second Respondent
Hearing: 24 June 2010
Appearances: Appellant appears in person
L Fong for Respondents
Judgment: 24 June 2010
ORAL JUDGMENT OF MILLER J
[1] Ms Vukomanovic seeks leave to appeal from my judgment of 20 May 2010. The application is opposed.
[2] In my judgment I declared that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a proposed appeal from the Residence Review Board, the appeal having been filed out of time. However, I treated the abortive appeal as an application for judicial review, and timetabled that for hearing on 29 July.
[3] Appearing today, Ms Vukomanovic began by explaining that she has complained to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner about me, saying that I was not
GORDANA VUKOMANOVIC V RESIDENCE REVIEW BOARD HC WN CIV 2010-485-497 24 June 2010
prepared to listen to her and that she was “pushed out” of the Court. She indicated that she was prepared to drop that complaint if some solution could be found and appeared to want to go through all her documents again. As I explained to her, that approach may be well-meaning but it is inappropriate. If she has a complaint to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, she should pursue it.
[4] Leave is required under s 116 of the Immigration Act 1987. The appeal must be on a point of law, and in determining whether to grant leave, the Court must have regard to whether the question of law is one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for its decision.
[5] The proposed appeal certainly raises a question of law. Further, no previous judgment has held that the time limit under s 115 of the Immigration Act 1987 is mandatory.
[6] Nonetheless, I do not consider that the proposed appeal is seriously capable of argument, because there is no proper basis on which Attorney-General v Howard (and the cases cited in it) can be distinguished.[1] On the contrary, any application for extension of time must be filed within the 28 days specified by the statute, and I will refer to s 115(2).
[1] Attorney-General v Howard [2010] NZCA 58 at 100.
[7] Ms Vukomanovic also complained that I had miscalculated time, finding that it had elapsed on 20 January. (I made no such finding.) She pointed to the Christmas period. However, her appeal was not filed until 18 March. She also argued that her circumstances are truly exceptional for various reasons relating to her family circumstances and her activities in New Zealand, such that it is unfair to deny her an appeal. Whether or not that is true, it cannot alter the meaning of the legislation.
[8] In her written submissions Ms Vukomanovic also appeared to raise a concern that she had insufficient opportunity to present her case on 20 May. That proposition is not tenable. It apparently rests on an assumption that the hearing was an
opportunity to deal with the merits, which I declined to hear. In any event, it raises no question of law that could merit a further appeal.
[9] Ms Vukomanovic further appears to take issue with some of the interlocutory directions made concerning the judicial review application; in particular, the direction that the Chief Executive be added as a respondent. Leave is not required insofar as she wishes to pursue an appeal from those directions. She will have to satisfy the Court of Appeal that an interlocutory appeal ought to be entertained.[2]
[2] Association of Dispensing Opticians of New Zealand Inc v Opticians Board [2000] 1 NZLR 158,
166.
[10] The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
Miller J
Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington for Respondents
- AGLC
- Vukomanovic v Residence Review Board HC Wellington CIV 2010-485-497 [2010] NZHC 985
- Case
- [2010] NZHC 985
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Ms Vukomanovic was entitled to leave to appeal the earlier judgment, specifically concerning the court's jurisdiction and the interpretation of the time limits set out in the Immigration Act 1987. The court considered whether the proposed appeal raised a point of law of general or public importance that warranted consideration by the Court of Appeal. Additionally, the court examined whether Ms Vukomanovic's arguments about exceptional circumstances and alleged miscalculation of time could form a basis for distinguishing previous cases on the matter.
The court found that while the proposed appeal raised a question of law, it did not consider the appeal to be seriously capable of argument. The court reasoned that the statutory time limit under section 115 of the Immigration Act 1987 was mandatory, and any application for an extension of time must be filed within the specified 28 days. The court further noted that the appeal was not filed until 18 March, well beyond the statutory deadline of 20 January. Furthermore, the court dismissed Ms Vukomanovic's complaint that she had insufficient opportunity to present her case, as the earlier hearing was not intended to deal with the merits of the case. Finally, the court addressed Ms Vukomanovic's concerns about interlocutory directions, stating that leave would not be required for an appeal from those directions but that she would need to satisfy the Court of Appeal that an interlocutory appeal should be entertained.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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