W v W

For a Court ready (fee required) version please follow this link

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 40/2009
[2009] NZSC 71

BETWEENCHRISTOPHER BEDE WARD

Appellant

ANDDIANA MARY WARD

Respondent

Court:Tipping, McGrath and Wilson JJ
Counsel:M E J Macfarlane and D G Matheson for Appellant

H R Grayson for Respondent

Judgment:1 July 2009

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is granted in part.

(REASONS)
[1] We consider that leave to appeal should be given on two of the proposed grounds but not on the third. The approved grounds are:
(i)Was the Court’s jurisdiction to vary the settlement ousted by s 182(6) of the Family Proceedings Act 1980?
(ii)If not, did the Court of Appeal err in upholding the way in which the Family Court exercised its jurisdiction under s 182?

[2] We have declined to give leave on the ground of whether what occurred in this case was a settlement within the meaning of s 182 because we are of the view that the decision of the Court of Appeal on this point is undoubtedly correct. We do not consider that the appellant’s proposed contentions are sufficiently arguable.
Solicitors:
Sainsbury Logan & Williams, Napier for Appellant
Gresson Grayson, Hastings for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of W v W, the appellant, Christopher Bede Ward, sought leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, which upheld the Family Court's order varying a settlement agreement between the parties. The respondent, Diana Mary Ward, defended the Family Court's decision. The Supreme Court of New Zealand was tasked with determining whether the appellant's proposed grounds for appeal were sufficiently arguable to warrant leave to appeal.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Family Court's jurisdiction to vary the settlement agreement was limited by section 182(6) of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 and, if not, whether the Court of Appeal was correct in affirming the Family Court's exercise of its jurisdiction. The court also considered whether the variation of the settlement agreement constituted a settlement within the meaning of section 182. The appellant argued that the Family Court's variation of the settlement agreement was improper, while the respondent maintained that the Family Court had the authority to make the variation.

The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on two of the proposed grounds but declined to grant leave on the third. The court found that the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding whether the variation was a settlement within the meaning of section 182 was undoubtedly correct and not sufficiently arguable. However, the court deemed the other two grounds—relating to the Family Court's jurisdiction and the exercise of that jurisdiction—sufficiently arguable to warrant an appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant's arguments concerning the Family Court's jurisdiction and the manner in which it exercised that jurisdiction were worthy of further consideration.

The final orders of the court were that leave to appeal was granted in part, specifically on the two grounds concerning the Family Court's jurisdiction and its exercise. The appeal was not allowed on the ground concerning the characterisation of the variation as a settlement.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established